


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19 MARCH 1990



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**

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# East Europe

JPRS-EER-90-034

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## INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

### Ceausescu's Plan To Sell Transylvanian Towns to Kadar Discussed

#### Hungarian Ex-Officials Deny Rumors

90EC0304A Budapest REFORM in Hungarian  
20 Oct 89 pp 1, 4-5

[Text] Gossip, slander, speculation, legend or genuine political event? Around the end of the 1970's, many people talked about it, always whispering: "Do not tell anyone." They used to add that they could not name their source, that the matter was strictly confidential and was revealed only to them, "from above."

Those who circulated the story never failed to add: "Now it is easier to understand the Old Man's strategy. The great chess player knows what he is doing; only he had to wait for the right time to make a move."

The story is that during the 1970's Janos Kadar pursued secret negotiations with Nicolae Ceausescu over the return to Hungary of historically Hungarian towns. Accordingly, Romania, in exchange for Hungary assuming some of its national debts, would have given up a part of Transylvania. After all, at that time the Romanian national debt was about \$9 billion, and this proved to be such a burden on the Ceausescu leadership that they decided to liquidate it by returning some historically Hungarian towns to Hungary. In accordance with the plan, Hungary would have reassumed control over the Nagyvarad-Temesvar-Arad region, that is, the western part of Transylvania. It is also claimed that the plan was first introduced by Romania.

The story claims that the two governments were close to coming to an agreement. That way, Ceausescu would have found an easy way out of the debt crisis, while Kadar (reluctantly) would have allowed his country to take on the terrible burden of servicing the debt. We would have become poorer than a church mouse, our squalor would have been similar to that of today's Romania, but we would have liberated a part of the country that was torn away from us. Contemporary sources claim that in the end the negotiations failed because the Romanian partner (seeing that the Hungarians were ready to pay) raised the ante to such a large amount which we were unable to accept.

Ten years have passed since this story circulated. Now we have turned to more than ten political personalities, inquiring whether there was any truth in the story. We consulted with people who, on account of their positions during the Kadar era, were familiar with events. Since some of them did not wish to see their names published, we decided not to give any names. Two counterintelligence operatives admitted that they have heard of these negotiations. When it came to the politicians, however, their answer was unequivocal: They have never heard a word about these talks.

"Since I was familiar with circumstances, I consider the story absurd," said the former Treasury official, "It seems that the Hungarians' power of imagination exceeds reality. Nationalistic desires had no room in the policies of the Kadar era. It is also impossible to imagine that the Romanians would have made this a point of negotiation, since this would have gone directly against their principles and the Dako-Roman hypothesis. At the same time, any such step would have been seen as a measure contrary to the interests of the great powers. After all, the smallest unraveling of the peace treaties could have initiated a general breakdown of the entire structure. No rational person, least of all Janos Kadar, could have risked that."

"I have never heard this mentioned, not even in the closed inner circles," said a calm MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] functionary, "Considering the spirit of the Helsinki Agreement and the speech made by Kadar at that conference, even the possibility of such a negotiation appears to be absurd."

"It is nonsense," a former official with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shook his head, "This is nothing more than dreaming and chasing illusions. Kadar would have never been a partner in such negotiations, and would not have considered assuming those debts; after all, we were already facing a sizeable indebtedness at the time."

"Naive illusion, children's story," the high-ranking military officer reasoned, "Romania's leaders could not have considered their indebtedness so severe as to enter such negotiations. As we saw, they solved their foreign debt problem; to be sure, at the cost of bringing squalor to their inhabitants. They would never give up Transylvania, so they could never initiate such a plan; not even if half of the population were to starve. Also, during the period in question, Romania's international image was much better than ours; thus, sober financial authorities would have never come up with an idea like this."

There is no question about it, none of these experts expressed views that would support the story of secret negotiations over Transylvania. On the other hand, they could not unequivocally deny it either. Evidently, the old reflex of keeping secrets is still alive in the former functionaries, so it is nearly impossible to obtain valid information from them. It is also more than peculiar that those who were involved in financial matters use foreign policy arguments to deny the story, while those who are familiar with international affairs keep referring to economic issues.

So, we can only ask: Are we really facing a legend, another episode of a Kadar myth now being created? Perhaps the story is nothing more than wishful thinking on the part of those who still believe in the former Hungarian party leader, demonstrating that the Old Man was thinking about something, he did not desert the "forgotten Hungarians [living in Romania]," he only acted like he was not doing anything while, in the background, he kept shuffling the deck.

It is being asserted that he did not shuffle the deck.

Or was he, after all?

**Reform Addresses Questions to Pacepa**

90EC0304B Budapest REFORM in Hungarian  
20 Oct 89 p 5

[Text] Using the assistance of our journalist colleagues in the United States, we asked the CIA to forward the questions below to the former Romanian General Pacepa.

1) General, you were once a confidant of the Romanian party leader, and thus you must have been familiar with the Securitate's factual and provocative acts aimed at Hungary. Did that organization ever make plans to incite Hungarian nationalism and suggest the promotion of territorial demands?

2) Did they ever calculate the extent of financial damage and the speed with which Hungary would have gone bankrupt if it were to regain certain regions of Transylvania for billions of dollars?

3) Did they prepare an evacuation plan; how successfully could they have evacuated the three large cities in question and their regions, and who would have ended up under Hungarian jurisdiction? Is there any truth in the story according to which you were entrusted with establishing a separate branch to train "pure Hungarian" Securitate agents who were to end up on the Hungarian side of the border?

4) Was Ceausescu serious about this territorial "auction," or did he merely consider it a trick to be pulled on Hungarians, knowing that they are acutely interested in the fate of Transylvania?

5) Can you name individuals who would have known about these secret negotiations, either in Romania or in Hungary?

6) In your opinion, why were negotiations broken off in the early stages? Was it perhaps because the Hungarians appeared too eager, and the Romanians immediately increased the price manyfolds?

7) What would be the situation in the regions mentioned above, if they were attached to Hungary and their inhabitants would demand their return to Romania?

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA****Secretary of Agrarian Party Defends Its Program**

90EC0260A Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY  
in Czech No 51-52, 1989 p 19

[Interview with Doc. Eng. Frantisek Trnka, C.Sc., deputy head for economics at the Unified Agricultural Cooperative Agrokombinat Slusovice and secretary of the preparatory committee of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party, by Jaroslava Markova and Milan Srb: "Large-Scale Production Is Absolute Necessity"; date and place not given; first three paragraphs are HOSPODARSKE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] The farm population is not screaming revolutionary slogans but rather founding its own party, says Doc. Eng. Trnka.

"I too like two cows, a piece of land, a neat farmhouse with a flock of chickens in the yard. Idyllic it may be, but it will not feed the Republic," says Doc. Eng. Frantisek Trnka, C.Sc., deputy head for economics at the Unified Agricultural Cooperative Agrokombinat Slusovice, well known on the pages of HOSPODARSKE NOVINY for promoting nonconformist, progressive views and experiences. This time however we sought him out because he is the secretary of the preparatory committee of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party.

Before we give him the floor, let us take a closer look at this outspoken personality, well known in agriculture. He was born in 1931, graduated in 1955 from the business management faculty of the School of Agronomics in Prague. He was then assigned to teach as an assistant at the chair of farm economics at the same school. Four years later he reported as a "cadre support" to the Unified Agricultural Cooperative [JZD] Uholicky where he worked for 3 years as the cooperative's chairman. Subsequently he returned to the School of Agronomics, working as a teacher concentrating on the economics of farm production until 1983. Then, already removed from CPCZ membership rolls, he went to work in the Slusovice JZD, first as an expert, later as head of the strategic development unit. After a year he was named economics director and ultimately the cooperative's deputy chief for economics.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] We hear reports that Slusovice is founding a political party. Has this initiative really come from you?

[Trnka] No. It was spontaneous, emerging in several places of the country at the same time. This shows that farmers miss their own political platform. As concerns Slusovice, we could do without this party. Slusovice achieved 30-percent performance increases even at a time when other cooperatives were not doing well. Today too we are prepared to face hard conditions. But agriculture as a whole needs backing. And having given good thought to many things, why shouldn't we offer our knowledge for the benefit of the party? But if cooperative members at the founding meeting 13 January in Zadverice say that they do not want anyone from Slusovice in the party leadership, then no one of us will be there.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Who can become a member of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party?

[Trnka] Any CSSR citizen 18 years of age or older. We get applications from individuals, collectives, cooperative members, state farm workers. Members could be food industry workers, foresters, agricultural school

teachers, horticulturists, people who raise small animals. Right now I don't have the exact number of applications to date though it must run into thousands, since applications are addressed not only here to Slusovice but also to other preparatory committee members.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] In the past what was the Agrarian Party organized individually operating farmers. Today we have socialist large-scale production in agriculture. What will be the farmers party's program? Will it not be a return to small-scale production?

[Trnka] In the United States 3 percent of the farms produce 80 percent of the market output. The other small farms represent something like our house gardens. So the tendency toward large-scale production is clear. To imagine that in Europe and the CSSR the trend will go the other way is improbable. We too must turn out the decisive part of output in large-scale production. If someone wants to play a big landowner, let him. But most people have no such strivings and tendencies. Thus we are left with either cooperatives or stock corporations.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] But will the people elected to head your party hold the same views?

[Trnka] This of course I cannot guarantee. But if there will be no people in the leadership who know the world trends, they will inevitably lead the party into a blind alley.

And consider also another aspect: introducing scientific and technological progress without which we cannot compete with the world, is extremely costly. So it must be large firms creating large profits, to be able to invest much in development. Thus it is not a wish but rather absolute necessity.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] In neighboring Austria, a comparable country with which we want to catch up in living standards, small farms receive support. Does this not refute your view, at least in part?

[Trnka] In Austria it is not because they want to produce in this fashion but rather than in the mountains they want to have these farmsteads to preserve the character of the landscape and to support tourism. They indeed do deduct the cost of repairing farm houses from taxes and subsidize those who provide rooms for vacationers. I believe that we too should make suitable use of this interest which is different from agriculture.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] It is our personal opinion that a farmers party will gain popularity, many supporters even from outside the business. So it surprised us that many agricultural workers are not that optimistic. They fear that the broad public today supposedly has a critical judgment of the village, that life there is better than in the city.

[Trnka] Life in the village today really is not bad. But let us consider the situation in the middle of the 1950's or at the beginning of the 1960's. At that time no one from the city was saying: You have hardly anything to put in your

mouth, so we will surrender half of our salaries and help you. I don't really want to talk about the past, but entering a cooperative was not an overly voluntary affair, farmers often had to sacrifice all their property. And when honest labor and better conditions that were created enabled them to achieve a certain level, many envy them for it and say that they want it too. We all work more in order that all of us have more. Not according to the principle of "my goat has died, let yours die too."

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] We have also heard the view that a farmers party will give a stronger position to agriculture. That it may become in some fashion a monopoly which in pressing its interests will raise the price of food in a market economy. That it could be, even though in an entirely different form, a diktat that could be seen in Poland.

[Trnka] We will not have a market economy starting tomorrow. This is in my opinion a process. And to remove the basis for such fears, there must be opportunities to trade with foreign countries. Farmers may choose to demand for instance Kcs 500 [korunas] for 100 kg of grain. But if I can import it for Kcs 120 from Canada, they may face the choice between 120 and nothing. Because all European countries engage in protectionism, grain is produced more cheaply overseas; we do not want to destroy our agriculture and so we may agree on 140 as the price. If our national economy is managed wisely, the situation should not become as acute as in Poland.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] It is often said that the village is conservative. That political changes don't excite it too much. This was observed in the past as well as the present revolutionary period. It has both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, a stabilized food market; on the other, open field for other political forces not defending the interests of the village.

[Trnka] It is not true that agriculture is excessively conservative. Already Lenin noted that its workers are scattered, that it is harder to organize them. When at Skoda one worker yells "Let us strike" he is heard by a thousand others. When a farmer yells he is heard by a hundred cows. Other factors too are operative here. When a factory worker stops his lathe, tomorrow he can, if he speeds up a little, catch up with what he missed. But if a farmer misses milking his cow today, tomorrow he will bring it to the slaughterhouse. These are objective conditions. So it is hard to expect from the farmer that after the first blush he will scream revolutionary slogans. His revolutionary stand today consists in being aware of the present state of affairs and organizing in a new party.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] How will the new party be organized, what will be its apparatus?

[Trnka] In each okres there will be one paid secretary who will have one secretarial aide. In the center there should be one full-time chairman and two vice chairmen.

The party's national committee would have 15 members (7 from the Czech and 7 from the Slovak Socialist Republic) and the vice chairmen would at the same time serve as chairmen of the republican sections represented in the national committee. We are also proposing four secretaries—for political matters, economics, ecology and social affairs, and legislation. All others should be unpaid functionaries.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Our last question was about the concrete programmatic goals of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party. Doc. Trnka handed us an extensive program statement from which, in order to round out the picture, we excerpt at least the passages concerning the farm economy:

Farmers know best that, without hard, persevering, honest, and purposeful labor, there is no common wealth. Our goal is to the common wealth of all who labor honestly, to contribute by our work to an enduring economic prosperity of the country. To achieve this goal, it is not enough to work honestly; it requires also the creation of corresponding economic conditions in the country. It is necessary to achieve a situation:

- Where it is possible to set up a variety of enterprises with different forms of property (state, cooperative, private, stock).
- Where the same economic rules apply to all types of enterprises and forms of property and no one may go beyond these rules to interfere with the internal operation and management of enterprises or the distribution of revenues created by them.
- Where farmers can finance their development from their own resources. Modern enterprises must therefore be able to create adequate resources by being the final sellers of their products and to help impart economic growth to enterprises still in a weaker position by appropriate linkages. Our goal is to supply the market with quality food in variety, at various yet commensurate prices.
- Where part of the peak production is marketed at freely set prices while assuring enough quality food for the wide consumer public at state-controlled prices.
- Where tax policy makes possible the growth of industries which assure food supply to the public. A critical situation exists especially in the food industry. Redistribution of resources at the central level fails to provide checks on their utilization. Subsidizing ineffective production lines cannot go on indefinitely and therefore a time-limited program must be worked out to find an economic solution to the problem. In this area too we reject any administrative intervention. Already today it is possible to put forward concrete proposals for resolving the situation, so that farmers have free and unmediated access to foreign markets. Our products are salable on foreign markets and an unencumbered foreign trade will make possible the growth of an entire industry assuring availability of

food for the people. This is confirmed by the experience of leading enterprises.

We reject administrative interference with enterprise management. We reject the allocation system. We demand that agriculture as well as the entire national economy be managed by means of economic instruments. We want to participate in the decisions on their creation. The basis for guiding the economy are suitably regulated supply-demand relations and a price, tax and credit system.

For the industry's development the financial system is of the essence. To enable us to make better and a more flexible use of the financial resources created in the agricultural-industrial complex for the development of the national economy, and to utilize also other resources for this purpose, we regard it as necessary to found our own agricultural bank.

### **New Independent Left Party Introduced**

90EC0283A Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak  
16 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with Jaroslav Travnicek by Vit Suchy: "For Socialism in Czechoslovak Tricolor"; date and place not given; first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Many CPCZ members are leaving the party because they are disappointed by its past policies and are not satisfied either by the results of the CPCZ extraordinary congress. But they do not want to remain on the outside and look for new groupings. Among those emerging now is the Independent Left Party (SNL). We are talking to Jaroslav Travnicek, a member of its preparatory committee.

[PRAVDA] Just recently the name of your political party has emerged on the Czechoslovak political scene. What led to its foundation?

[Travnicek] It was a product of the conclusion of the CPCZ extraordinary congress. We took part in it as guests within a delegation of the Democratic Forum of Communists. Many of us were disappointed not only by the discussions but especially by the results. Already during the proceedings a more radical group from the congress guests came together, demanding that the DFK [Democratic Forum of Communists] abandon the CPCZ platform as an expression of dissent and adopt a position outside of it as a body of opinion. Alas, disunity even within the DFK as well as its indecisiveness in mapping out further action and goals led us to a parting of ideas with the DFK movement as well.

[PRAVDA] At the most recent DFK meeting you already passed out membership applications. What did you have in common with the DFK and thus also the CPCZ?

[Travnicek] Originally all of us were CPCZ members. Then we were attracted to the DFK. What persuaded us was above all its key idea—to create a current of opinion

for renewal within the CPCZ and work for its purification from the inside. Alas, we soon found disunity there about the actions to be taken. In short, the DFK's programmatic outlook did not satisfy us.

[PRAVDA] So now you don't fancy any left force, say a party, club or movement?

[Travnicek] We want to take a somewhat different road than all the other political parties. Our sustaining idea—apart from independence and allegiance to the left—is, as I might characterize it, everyday politics. I would summarize our position—even though it may not be putting it very precisely—as being the left-wing partner of the Civic Forum.

[PRAVDA] This is open to many interpretations....

[Travnicek] We do not see our main purpose as resolving macropolitical issues, but as a party we want to concentrate on resolving everyday problems and issues concerning man. We want to talk not only about what needs to be changed but especially how. In this regard I believe we differ from all the other parties. But still we are prepared to submerge our own political ambitions of a party in favor of a left movement as a whole.

[PRAVDA] Although you have many reservations about the CPCZ surely there must be some points of consensus.

[Travnicek] I believe there will be quite a few of them. That's because the program of any party—and not only on the left—can show no radical departure. After all, none of them will want a weak economy, support unemployment or social impoverishment. With the CPCZ we will certainly have in common interest in strengthening the people's certainty of social protection and limiting adverse effects on the socially weak strata.

[PRAVDA] Among those of you who have united on this platform, are you close in professional composition or do you represent a variety of backgrounds, including social?

[Travnicek] There is no preponderance of any specific professional group. As regards social composition, basically 90 percent are members of the intelligentsia ranging from technical to the humanities.

[PRAVDA] Your name includes "independent"—but from whom and what?

[Travnicek] Independent because as a party we do not want to submit to any ideological diktat or doctrine. On the contrary. We want to draw fully on the humanist thought of our own and foreign origin. Be it Masaryk, Marx or Lenin, the first consideration will be what is progressive. Independence politically does not mean that we will not join a united left coalition. But if we join a coalition, then only with the intent of being equal partners, without subordinating ourselves in favor of someone else or another party.

[PRAVDA] This is really difficult to sort out. So I am asking, would you join an election coalition of the left, or not?

[Travnicek] The left as such cannot emerge successfully from the election without a left coalition. But within it we reject the principle of subordination to some other party.

[PRAVDA] Now if you permit this rather general—though still very topical—question: Are you in favor of socialism?

[Travnicek] The concept of socialism itself is in our view, to put it mildly, discredited mainly because of our own Stalinist, neo-Stalinist or Brezhnevist system. But we will strive for socialism in the spirit of the West European socialist parties. Hence we want a more precise definition of the concept of socialism as we perceive it. We do not wish to apply the standard definition of socialism of the Swedish or Swiss type, but rather talk about it in connection with its applicability to the conditions of our country.

[PRAVDA] So a socialism in the Czechoslovak tricolor?

[Travnicek] Yes, it could be put that way.

[PRAVDA] Many of our government representatives are talking about trouble-free development as we modernize the economy. Will this not weaken your position as a party defending preservation of social rights?

[Travnicek] On the contrary. Soon there will be pronounced social conflicts. And precisely here the left should have its role, strengthening its influence by a vigorous and uncompromising struggle for the people's social safety. This is the definite road it must take. Not on the basis of destructive criticism but on the contrary, by constructive opposition.

Editor's note: The first public assembly of the Independent Left Party will take place on Wednesday, 17 January, at 1700 hours in the auditorium of the Philosophical Faculty of Charles University in Prague.

### **Communist Functionary on Party's Future**

90EC0271A Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech  
30 Jan 90 pp 1, 5

[Article by Peter Weiss, chairman of the executive committee of the CPSL [Communist Party of Slovakia] Central Committee: "The Only Solution—Resolute Renewal of the Party"]

[Text] The party whose members we are has found itself at a crossroads. It is not true that this is its first experience of this kind. We have been facing the same situation continuously, because the party has never been any different than our society, although we so often and so happily used to proclaim that we are the vanguard of this society. The party could not be different because both the progressive and regressive forces were always



present in it like the rising and ebbing tides. Repeated statements about the kind of character the party had were frequently nothing more but familiar false presentation of wishful thinking as reality.

Today we have only two options left: Either we shall promptly and radically change our ideology, organization and obviously, also our name and thus, transform ourselves into a modern European left-wing party with its own original identity, with an attractive and realistic program, and with strong political personalities, as we envisioned at the extraordinary congress of the CPCZ [Czechoslovak Communist Party], or we cannot rid ourselves of all the neo-Stalinist ballast in a dignified manner and we shall gradually transform ourselves into a sect and forfeit real influence in our society.

Therefore, to succumb to feelings of proud defiance against the political and social reality at this moment, to let ourselves be carried away by nostalgia for the good old days, to become all wrapped up in ourselves, our wounds and pains, or to follow the rule "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" and concentrate on returning every blow inflicted to us, whether we deserved them or not would mean in fact that we would miss our chance to exert a positive influence on the future of the nations and nationalities living in our country.

We must realize that we are experiencing a deep crisis that has not stricken our party alone, but has in reality affected the whole movement. We must stop judging either this crisis in which we have found ourselves as a former state party, or the problems, which had accumulated in our society during our rule, exclusively by means of categories of individual morality, political incompetence or erroneous political decisions, as it still often happens.

Thus, we cannot deny that it is inevitable to draw strict consequences within the party for the political and moral failure on the part of some functionaries. Our historical defeat has far deeper systemic causes stemming from certain ideological dogmas to which we, as the ruling party, tried to forcibly adapt reality, from basic theoretical solutions to organization of society characteristic for our political decisionmaking, from disrespect to historical traditions of our nations, and so on. We may say that the historical roots of our current problems go back to the period when the international workers' movement split in 1914.

For that very reason the extraordinary CPCZ congress appointed the central committee to set up a commission for an analysis of the whole history of the Czechoslovak workers' and communist movements. Among its task will be to explain the historical background of the situation after Smeral's departure from the leading office in the party when the predominance in the CPCZ was seized again and again, with minor intervals, by a sectarian-dogmatic anarchistic movement whose social basis was actually lumpenproletarian-petit bourgeois and which was represented in the Communist Party of

Slovakia by such individuals as Viliam Siroky, Pavel David, Karol Bacilek and Vasil Bilak.

It is our duty to act promptly and from objective scientific positions of our party members and of our public and to shed light on the dark and tragic pages of our history, namely, in the context of the history of the international workers' and communist movement. Only thus will it be possible to shed from our shoulders the burden of the past and by the same token, to recover the genuine positive values introduced by our party into the modern history of our nations.

We cannot overcome the crisis of confidence in our party if we simply fail to fundamentally restore its strongly tainted ideological identity, and to recognize the problems in its social base and its place in the newly developing political spectrum, its symbolism and title. In other words, next to its moral purification, the pivotal task of our party on its path to its restructuring into a modern left-wing party is also its fundamental ideological rearmament.

Here the objective is not that in common view socialism and communism are often mechanically identified as totalitarian systems of government symbolized in recent times particularly by Ceausescu's dictatorship. Our objective is to define our relations to the European Left in general and to theoretical solutions and values of the communist movement in particular; to define our relations to historical achievements of the social-democratic movement; to assess the historical experience with the application of Leninism in our conditions; to understand democracy, etc.

Our ideological and theoretical rearmament is not only imperative for the transformation of the party and its integration in the European left-wing movement; moreover, it is a precondition for the organization of our preselection coalition with other left-wing parties and groups in Czechoslovakia, and finally, it is a precondition for our regaining much of the intelligentsia which had been driven into the arms of the civic initiative groups by Bilak's and Jakes' machinations. Let us recall the pressures exerted on Milos Zeman, a prognostic expert, for his article in *TECHNICKY MAGAZIN*.

Particularly important is the planning of a strategy to win over the young generation, not only for the elections but with a view to the future.

If within a certain period of time we fail to attract our young and middle-aged generation, we as a party will face a joyless future. The same applies to our social base in general. We cannot afford to make a strategic error by focusing exclusively on protection of the workers' class in branches of production that have no hope for the future, and by leaving to other parties the professional and social groups and strata that promote scientific and technical progress and development. Of course, on the other hand, we cannot forget that we intend to be a party of people who live from the fruits of their labor—in other words, first and foremost, the party of the workers' class.

Those are serious theoretical, and in the final analysis, also practical political problems; the method and quality of their solution will determine whether the CPCZ can transform itself into a really modern European left-wing party, and whether this will not be just another slogan and a case of slow, gradual decline of the membership, particularly among the intelligentsia, and of an accelerated paralysis of the party because of surviving Stalinist deformations in its internal life—in its ideology.

This must be emphasized also because the extraordinary congresses of the CPSL and CPCZ demonstrated considerable intolerance of the delegates to addresses stressing theoretical issues. This was due to the fact that we were preoccupied with urgent problems of our self-preservation.

In my view, it also demonstrated a return of anti-intellectualism which is a characteristic feature of the neo-Stalinist type of the party the CPCZ used to be until quite recently.

Therefore, if we fail to return to our best traditions of work with the intelligentsia, to mobilize the intellectual potential still remaining in our party, and also to involve intellectuals, particularly scientists and artists, from other left-wing groups in the solution of certain problems, our chances may decline not only as concerns the elections but also the future.

Today an urgent question arises: What guarantees can we offer those who want to go with us, with our party, as part of the left-wing movement. Obviously, the main guarantee is the fact that we shall provide opportunities for their knowledge and experience which they want to contribute. We want to promote the interests of persons who support themselves by the work of their hands or mind. Their benefits must be our benefits, their grievances our grievances.

As a party, we have the duty to create every programmatic and organizational opportunity for that. We began to analyze the roots of the current crisis in the party, and to draft a constructive program. Nevertheless, the whole membership base must join in this work and offer its views. The purpose of these efforts cannot be just the planning of the election campaign, but above all, a speedy organization of a new left-wing party.

The most important thing for every political party is to respect reality, however harsh it may be. That does not mean that we should not have any ideals and visions of the future. However, we must get rid of our thinking of old stereotypes, because we do not need a uniformity of views; we cannot build any new ideological monoliths which after all never were real monoliths. In this respect, life has taught us many lessons. One of the most important of them, in my view, is the fact that sectarian morality irreversibly corrupts one's character and shows contempt for specific human destinies.

Absolutization of the class aspect to the detriment of the humanitarian factor, artificial fomenting of hatred

where understanding would be far more appropriate, and, in particular, intolerance to other views not only outside the party but, as we are well aware, especially within the party—those precisely are the fundamental spiritual causes of the crisis in which we have found ourselves.

We were greatly hurt in particular by our militant atheism which frequently was used almost as the only criterion of communist orthodoxy. Because of the widespread religious faith in Slovakia, many party members were religious believers; in their case, the result often was a kind of schizophrenia, secret attendance of religious services, etc.

I think that the time has come for us to deal with this issue in the same way as it is done, for example, by our Italian and Polish comrades, i.e., with regard to social realities. One of our most urgent tasks is to remedy the seriously damaged relations with the believers and to help overcome prejudice in the interest of their cooperation in the solution of the problems facing our country.

We see our main task in helping create a society where all hard-working and decent people will have a good life. For that reason, the contention that "the worse things get, the better for us" is, and must be, alien to us. Such a contention has already been proclaimed by one party in Czechoslovakia, and there is no need to imitate it.

We cannot and will not build on cheap social demagoguery. We want neither a confrontation nor a destruction of our society; on the contrary, we want to prevent destabilization of our society, a breakdown of our state administration and production, and disorganization of our society during this transitional period before free elections. All political forces in our society must cooperate in order to achieve these goals and in the interest of truly free elections characterized by high political standards.

Today we are reviewing our past and our attitudes and are seeking solutions for the future. We are learning to perceive life in its endless variability, with all problems posed by it. By the same token, we cannot, and do not want to, relinquish our right and duty to seek our own answers to those questions.

These fundamental aspirations at the transformation of our party into a modern European left-wing party, with all its consequences, for the welfare of the working man, for fair relations among the nations and nationalities living in our country, and for equal opportunities for everybody, certainly make it worth trying to spare no efforts and to persevere in the difficult political struggle not only with our political partners but with ourselves and with the legacy of Stalinism in our organization and in our ideology. Let us wish ourselves great success and optimism in this struggle.

**CPCZ Daily on Background of 1950's Trials**

90EC0275A Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech  
2 Feb 90 p 9

[Article by Miroslav Siska: "Political System as Support of Unlawfulness; Blank Areas of Our History—The 1950's"; first paragraph is RUDE PRAVO introduction]

[Text] If, on the whole, the origin of political processes can be safely found in external pressures, then the source and the framework, within which the mechanism that created them came into existence, were created by the political system of that time. Its post-February restructuring into a one-party monopoly and the principle of shifting gears represented the most important internal source which contributed to the realization of the political processes. It is useful, therefore, to look more closely at its structure and functioning, because that, too, brings us closer to a truthful answer to the key question: Wherein were the causes and mechanism of the deformations? How in fact was all that possible?

It is a known fact that in Czechoslovakia in the post-February period there was resistance from individuals as well as groups to the political line of the CPCZ. Part of the resistance indisputably had the character and marks of a class struggle, but another part was a defensive reaction to the manner in which the CPCZ was realizing its program of building a socialist society. It must be said, that not infrequently that was done in contradiction to its previous promises and concepts (for example, as related to small business and craftsmen, farmers, nonparty and party intelligentsia, political adversaries and nonparty people in general). At the same time, as a result of previous developments the CPCZ had a great opportunity to gain for its side truly the majority of the nation. But it adopted the Stalinist theory of intensifying the class struggle, the natural consequence of which was to classify political adversaries as enemies, spies, and traitors who must be liquidated.

Another internal source of the political processes were certain political tensions and economic difficulties. The part of the working class, which was politically the most active and had the greatest stake in socialism as it was then understood, very soon after February 1948 began to feel that those values which they associated with it were threatened. That was the period of fundamental changes in the Czechoslovak economy, when there were great tensions even in the social status of the people and when political processes could act to some extent as a safety valve.

**System of Personal Power**

The new political system, then, was being born in a period filled with class conflicts and social tensions. It grew from the results of February 1948, and particularly from the fact that the Communist Party became the sole deciding governing power in the country and the political system was to express in a new way its position of power.

One of the most distinct features of the system was the until then unknown concentration of power. The structure of the governing agencies and the mechanism of governing resulted in the concentration of all power in the political, economic, and cultural spheres in the hands of a narrow group of party functionaries. The CPCZ agencies issued directives to the executive power, and they thus became the principle creators of the line, the party influencing its implementation down to the smallest detail.

All linkages for the control of power, which a political system must have, were totally disrupted. The system of personal power destroyed them completely. From the hands of a numerically small group, power was gradually transferred to one person—the representative of the party and the state. The period encompassing the last years of Klement Gottwald's life (1949-53), also called the cult of personality, was distinguished by his natural authority and trust in him, and at the same time by confidence in the correctness of his decisions. (The system of personal power manifested itself also in the next period, but this time those involved lacked his natural authority and trust and had to use other means to consolidate their leading positions.)

Such uncontrollable power was wielded not only by the governing group, but also by other agencies and units of the power structure (such as Security, as well as lower ranking agencies and others). Such a state of affairs was contrary to the constitution and valid laws, even those which were the work of the Party. At the same time the natural political responsibility for the actions of the constitutional authorities and political functionaries could not be invoked, because they were answerable not to the appropriate state agencies or to agencies and citizens who elected them, but to the party officials in the top echelons of party leadership.

The mechanism of the system of personal power cannot, of course, be reduced to unlimited power of one individual. His power could be exercised only through an entire machinery of party and state officials. They often became obedient executors of instructions given by the wielder of personal power, without regard to the norms of party life and laws. Without this machine the system of personal power could not function. At the same time, this system was creating such relationships in the leading agencies of the party and the state, that the suppression of democratic principles in society created the same phenomenon in the government agencies.

Functionaries working in this machine fulfilled their roles for various personal motives. Some did so out of conviction that they were serving socialism and believed in the correctness of their actions; others did for the sake of securing their social standing; still others did not have enough courage to speak up or did not think it appropriate to speak up, although they knew or felt that various decisions were not right. The entire development

of the system of personal power was accompanied by the persecution of a number of party functionaries, even some of the highest rank.

In such a climate, of course, people lost the courage to tell the truth, and confrontations of political views disappeared. Responsibility during political proceedings and control over political decisions were declining. The system of personal power gave political decisionmaking an ideological justification, and very often it wrongly took refuge in citing Marxism-Leninism, the working class, etc.

### Relationship of Order and Obedience

As a result of the concentration of power, the sovereignty in the execution of governmental functions and of the parliament, as well as the independence of the courts, were destroyed.

The government did not govern, it did not direct and formulate the political line of the state. That was formulated in the agencies of the Communist Party. In addition, entire areas were gradually being taken out of the government's jurisdiction. The government therefore functioned only as an administrative office for carrying out decisions. The fact that many members of the government were also at the same time members of the party leadership made no difference. The trend was toward combining the functions of members of the government presidium and the political secretariat of the CPCZ Central Committee. Things went so far that in 1953 the members of both bodies were the same people, and so they agreed to combine the meetings of both bodies so that important matters could be dealt with at one meeting without wasting time...

The parliament, too, lost its function in the political system. It ceased to be the supreme legislative body which would discuss, modify, and approve laws and control the government. Its only function left was to approve. Its role in the political mechanism was quite undignified. Thus were fulfilled the words of R. Slansky, who shortly after February 1948 already pronounced it irrelevant, "because we shall make the decisions," that is, in the agencies of the party. The National Front ceased to be the platform on which the political line of the state was being formulated by negotiations among the participating forces, and became a mere tool for its implementation, without any possibility to influence it in some substantive way or control it.

The Communist Party began to isolate itself and set itself apart from society, to place itself above it and at the same time make decisions about it. The internal life of the party had the tendency to create an exceptionally powerful position for the party apparatus in which the pivotal influence on the levers of power and decision-making was concentrated. Some leaders appropriated a great deal of power for themselves, some less.

At various levels of the CPCZ structure decisions were made about all principal and sometimes secondary questions of political, economic, and cultural life. The governing group of people, which exercised and represented this power, always got together. At the same time that the sphere of power of the party was widening its cohesion with society and its democratic internal party control were weakening. The democratic principles and elements of internal party life were growing weak and gradually disappearing.

Democratic processes were dislodged and replaced by party discipline, which was often equated with blind obedience. This principle was becoming one of the key principles in building the party. The system of subordination in everything and without exception was built mainly on the principle of "service to the Party." It therefore supported itself by the most clear-cut relations and thus almost never encountered resistance or limits. It permeated the entire party organism.

Under such circumstances, the principle of democratic centralism was totally deformed and the word "democratic" became merely an ornamental attribute. Decisions of a narrow governing group, which gave itself the right to speak for all of the CPCZ, were passed off as decisions of the majority. Democratic centralism was used to force under its guise such distortions and resolutions on the rank and file members that by adopting them they became accomplices, even though they were misled. This subjugation through party discipline and unconditional fulfillment of directives assigned tasks unquestionably helped to make possible unlawful practices because communists-judges, members of Security, as well as communists-representatives had to follow orders of their superiors and possibly even vote for them, even when they were in direct contradiction to the goals of the party. It makes no difference that most of the CPCZ members did not realize there was such a conflict.

### Central Committee on Automatic

The mechanism of the internal life of the party resulted in an unlimited power of the central agencies, which, moreover, was conferred only on a few individuals. They then made decisions on the main questions of Czechoslovak policies.

The Central Committee, as the supreme elected agency, did not have a commensurate influence. It gradually found itself in a position in which it just passively approved the decisions and political line of the Presidium (or later an even narrower political secretariat). It never protested, it did not even make an effort to exercise its authority and function. However, it must be said that under the conditions of the prevailing theory of an intensified class struggle and in the framework of the existing party system, that was possible only at a considerable risk to every individual.

But even the Presidium of the Central Committee as a whole, elected at the 9th CPCZ Congress in May 1949, did not share in the formulation and implementation of

policies. For one thing, it never deliberated on the most important questions—for example, security, army, foreign policy, and others—for another, a practice became established in the system of its work which gave Klement Gottwald the last and decisive word. Everyone took his views as binding and correct. Soon he began consulting only with a circle of his closest collaborators, most often with R. Slansky, A. Zapotocky, and V. Siroky.

It was precisely this group of four that comprised since January 1951 an unofficially established political secretariat, which was later officially confirmed in September of the same year. To the existing members were added K. Bacilek, J. Dolansky, and A. Cepicka. After the recall of R. Slansky (6 December 1951) A. Novotny and V. Kopecky were additionally elected as well. In the hands of these seven, later eight, functionaries was concentrated all the power in the economy, politics, and culture. Controlled by nobody, and uncontrollable.

This institutional centralization was supplemented by groups not anchored in the constitution (groups of three, four, five) selected from the appropriate party agencies close to the CPCZ presidium. They often made independent decisions on very important questions and acted in place of the elected bodies. But these groups soon disappeared and their role was taken over in a somewhat changed form by the rampant party apparatus. However, some groups of three or five (for example, in Security) remained and they played a significant role.

#### Did Anyone Know the Truth?

A special position in the political system was held by Security, or to be more exact, by its components. Even before February 1948 Security was beyond the government's control. That process intensified after February. The government did not discuss questions of Security and did not know about its activities. Leading party agencies were not informed either, and they did not exercise control over its activities. The controlling agency was the Security group of five, and decisive were, above all, consultations with Klement Gottwald.

The situation was developing in such a way that Security units were gradually becoming beyond any control whatsoever. Their emancipation from state and party agencies turned into their superiority over them. This process accelerated especially after the arrival of Soviet experts. That, of course, made the relations between the Security group of five and a narrow circle of functionaries (later political secretariat) on one hand, and the Security officials on the other hand, more complicated. Security officials were given the right to decide on many cadre questions as well as on a number of high state and party functionaries. In reality, however, they were indirectly influencing the entire political line of the state, because they directed interrogations and arrests at certain groups of functionaries who were overwhelmingly selected by Security itself.

An extraordinary position within State Security was held by the group for rooting out enemies from the party. Its

members felt subordinate to absolutely nobody. They saw their position as being even above the leadership of the party, and were distrustful and suspicious of all party functionaries, agencies, as well as communists. They felt themselves to be the sole executors of Gottwald's instructions on protecting the party and socialism. The only authority they recognized were the Soviet advisers.

Security, the army, and agencies of oppression general thus pushed their way to the head of the power mechanism of the state. Then they had the capacity to constantly maintain tensions, renew the sources of their existence, and thus also justify their reason for being. Social tensions and unrest thus became central to them. The tensions gave them birth and the political system in turn multiplied them, honed them for encounters, and constantly renewed them. Thus was created a mutual interlinkage of political and social tensions and the political system, and out of its synthesis grew political encounters and political processes without which the system could not have existed.

The system of governing subjugated everything to itself—legislation, justice, security, the system for directing society. It created relations and circumstances that made it impossible to learn the truth and promote justice. It could exist only because it had this "base"; in another respect this base constituted part of its mechanism. Many then made decisions without knowing the truth, but at the same time they were also links in the chain that made it impossible to learn the truth. In such a way decisions were adopted not only in courts, but also in the political sphere, not only in Security, but also in the economy. It was the system of decisionmaking which the power mechanism created for itself, it was the system of governing which it was implementing and which kept it in power.

And so it was natural and unmercifully logical that the consequences of such a mechanism befell also those who were part of it, even though they did not understand how it was possible. From an initial elimination of democratic principles from the life of society, to the dismantling of the system of controls inside the party itself, a mechanism was set in motion which in the end could not be controlled even by those who held the most power in their hands.

#### Historians Concerned About Constitutional Inequality

90EC0257A Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 26 Jan 90 p 2

[Article signed by the Historical Sciences Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences: "Again the Fate of Slovakia Is Being Decided"]

[Text] Today's revolutionary changes have brought many unexpected turns and transformations. We hope that the road to democratic renewal, pluralism and openness in our society is irreversible and that never

again will there be in our country a revival of totalitarianism, moral and physical pressures on the individual or on entire population groups. But not all that is currently happening here is suited only to encourage optimism. There are developments causing serious concern about Slovakia's future in our state, despite President Vaclav Havel's New Year's address. Suffice to mention only the fact that official positions on various levels and in different spheres are being assumed by people who are not expert or competent to hold them.

Therefore, we are taking the liberty of expressing to you our concerns about the implementation and shape of our state's federative system, about the condition in which the Slovak national statehood finds itself. There is a tendency to regress on the basic constitutional principle of our state that Czechoslovakia is the common state of two nationalities—Czechs and Slovaks—who have voluntarily united in a common state entity. Organizations, associations and political parties are being founded which do not respect the federative principle, do not establish republican organizations. There are many indications that university students and trade unions are forming organizational structures with centers that come close to reflecting an asymmetrical model of organizing our social life. We are not opposed to youth and trade union organizations operating on a statewide basis, but we want to see their organizational structures correspond to the federative system of our state. Past experience tells us how difficult it is to change them later, how complicated is the mechanism, once brought into motion, of election preparations, economic changes for a good cause. Thus we regard it as necessary that already now, when preparations have begun for the elections, all political parties state their position on our state system and clarify their operation in conformity with its territorial organization. If the federative order of our state is to be fully respected, the law too should provide for an organizational form in the operation of political parties and creation of new organizations and associations on a republican basis. In this respect the SSR [Slovak Socialist Republic] Government and the SNR [Slovak National Council] as constituent bodies of the state power can play a major role and issue a declaration on the matter. But this requires political parties, organizations and others to respect the sovereign rights of the SNR, the SSR Government and the SSR's sovereignty. The design of a new state emblem should give a stronger heraldic expression to the fact that Czechoslovakia is a state of two nations—that is, that the state emblem is halved and an entire half given to the historical Slovak national symbol. This would avoid fears that when changes in the Constitution come up Slovakia will be relegated to the status of an administrative unit rather than a sovereign state of the Slovak nation. In this context, Slovakia should have a respectable and genuine parliament as was demanded already by the fathers of our national revival in 1848. Therefore, despite some reservations, we favor it being located in a newly erected SNR building. We believe in the need to recognize fully and respect in practice all the rights of the Slovak nation

and nationalities living in Slovakia, so that they may administer their country freely and in accordance with their will. This is the more important because of our tragic experiences from 1938-39, the time of World War II and ultimately also the 1950's and 1960's. In those days efforts, though inspired by different motives, to obtain for Slovakia full rights and corresponding amenities were judged separatist, as one of the causes of Czechoslovakia's breakup or weakening. It is precisely from this point of view that we are concerned about certain tendencies among minority nationalities, where one sees efforts to cast doubt on the SSR's territorial integrity and state sovereignty. We understand that the care of nationalities is a concern for the entire state, but we oppose the formation of a Federal Ministry for Nationalities. There should be no reduction of powers already established, nor elevation of a ministry above national organs. Nor is there a need to circumvent them, as in the case of the Civic Forum which made promises to Ukrainians-Ruthenians with regard to a Ukrainian National Council, even though the efforts to restore its activity have a distinct separatist and nationalist ring, proceeding from the demand for tearing away part of Slovakia's territory. We propose that no succor be given to the activity of "National Councils" and particularly if their founders are people accusing the Slovak nation of a genocidal policy. The existence of "National Councils" casts doubt on SNR's sovereignty and the territorial integrity of our state. The seriousness of these actions is underscored by preparations for a change in the territorial organization of our state on the occasion of the elections. As concerns its federative system, we recall the fate of proposals made in 1968-69. We assume that Slovakia will again have a two-tier system of National Committees and that the Czech lands will rather incline toward a land (province) system which is also the goal of the Moravian population's activities. This would roughly correspond to historical traditions, but the latest statement by President Vaclav Havel about a dignified place for Moravia in the state emblem suggests the possibility of a new federative organization of the state. This gives rise to fears of a possible majority against the interests of Slovakia and the Slovak nation as a constituent part of the state. Thus it is undesirable to have land (province) councils set up in Slovakia. We must hold consistently that the question of Moravia's status is an internal matter of the Czech Socialist Republic, not a federal issue. Vis-a-vis Slovakia, the issue is to take account of its specific conditions and respect its status and national organs. This is true not only because after eliminating the kraj system in Slovakia, it will be necessary to regulate the status of Slovak national organs vis-a-vis the Czech ones, as well as their relationship to the territorial local organs of state power and administration, so that there is no repetition of what happened in 1960 and 1969-70. And so that we do not again face the argument as in 1971 when the two-tier system of National Committees in Slovakia was abolished, that there has to be a uniform model of state administration in the whole of Czechoslovakia. In this way it is necessary to take into account the specifics of development in

the Czech lands and Slovakia and to reflect them also in case of a different organizational structure for the local organs of state power and administration. National Committees, or rather the administration of towns and villages, should be based on self-government, the ways of financing them by means of taxes, levies and allocations should be changed, the status of Local and City National Committees strengthened. In the election law we should see provisions for a direct election of deputies rather than having them put in place by political parties, something contrary to democratic principles on electing deputies by the people and overseeing their activity. So that the laws give full expression of and provide conditions for the important role of the representative functions of the national councils and National Committees of both republics, so that through them Czechoslovakia's citizens can administer their country wisely and successfully.

In the present revolutionary period the fate of Slovakia is again being decided for a long time to come. Let us not allow ourselves to be again relegated to an unequal, asymmetrical position. The SSR Government and the SNR ought to adopt an unequivocal position in these matters and make it public as soon as possible.

#### **Participation in Roundtable Discussions Explained**

*90EC0276A Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech  
31 Jan 90 pp 1, 3*

[Interview with SVOBODNE SLOVO editor Petr Kucera, representative of the Civic Forum's coordinating center, by Martin Denemark; date and place not given]

[Text] [SVOBODNE SLOVO] The roundtable discussions are among the most important events in our country. The public is dissatisfied with the brief official reports. You have recently chaired the federal roundtable discussions and so you can reveal some details to us. Who sits at the roundtable?

[Kucera] Sitting at the roundtable are the current political parties—that is, the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, the Czechoslovak People's Party, the CPCZ, in Slovakia then the Freedom Party and the Democratic Party. Complementing them are the new political forces representing Civic Forum in the Czech lands and the Public Against Violence. The National Front has a specific role: It provides the political logistics by securing meeting rooms, convoking participants, playing to some extent an organizer's role but of course without having its own negotiating position.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] Is the number of participants in the individual delegations limited in any way?

[Kucera] The number of participants is agreed upon prior to each meeting. It depends on what subjects are on the agenda. As a rule each party has three participants.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] Gradually disputes are emerging about additional chairs at the table. Which of the new parties may participate and what are the basic conditions for participation?

[Kucera] The number of new political parties is growing by the week. In Slovakia there is a special situation: The vast majority of the newly emerging parties adhere to the National Front. It was precisely the Slovak National Front's demand that there be a definite rule on who will sit at the roundtable because in recent weeks still more political parties sat on the Slovak contingent. Their number was reduced and they are represented by the NF [National Front]. In the Czech lands, the situation is substantially simpler: The NF does not play an integrating role here. As far as I know, until now only the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party is seeking cooperation with the NF. Nearly all the new parties seek cooperation with the OF [Civic Forum]; many of them are working actively in our environment and these parties too are represented by the OF in the discussions. We reckon that their participation will be given a higher profile; in the forthcoming roundtables, the strongest of them, such as the Czechoslovak Social Democracy, the Czechoslovak Democratic Initiative and the Christian Democratic Party will probably have their own representation. The roundtables will most likely continue until the elections. It has been proposed that from the date the political parties can announce their election candidacy they should have representation at the roundtable. If a party is strong enough to run its own candidates, it should have its own representation at the table.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] What is the atmosphere of the discussions?

[Kucera] They are conducted in a very constructive spirit. I believe that so far all the political parties and movements have been aware of the great responsibility they take upon themselves and of the need to attain as quickly as possible an optimum resolution of the social situation.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] So there has not yet been an insolvable dispute there...

[Kucera] We are running into partial problems on a lower level. At the same time with the federal, Czech and Slovak roundtables there are ones being started in the krajs and okreses. There are many cases in which a compromise was reached only with difficulty. We had this experience at the Prague roundtable when reconstruction of the capital city's National Committee was on the agenda. When it came to determining the key for representation on its council the negotiations were deadlocked and we had to seek a compromise at the next session.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] What should be on the roundtable's agenda in the forthcoming weeks?

[Kucera] There are several matters—reconstruction of representative bodies, territorial administration system,



and the like. We will also tackle distribution of newsprint. A political decision will have to be adopted which will change the system of allocating this material in short supply.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] The roundtable decided on the method of recalling Communist deputies, especially those who most discredited themselves. Some of them try to save themselves by turning in their party cards and claiming to be nonpartisan, or for instance join the Social Democracy. What was decided to deal with such cases?

[Kucera] We proceed from the assumption that the date of 17 November determines membership status. In cases where a deputy quits his political party, two possibilities apply. If he is now not a member of any party, he is subject to the provision of constitutional law according to which his recall will be decided by agreement between OF and NF. If he has joined another political party, that party must assume responsibility for him. If the reasons for his recall remain valid and it is not possible to achieve a reasonable agreement with his new party, the same procedure will be applied to this deputy as in the case of one who belongs to no party.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] So that even if a discredited deputy changes his coat and does not see fit to resign on his own, he won't be able to save his skin....

### **Former Samizdat LIDOVE NOVINY Enjoys Great Popularity**

90EC0301A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German  
12 Feb 90 pp 152-153

[Unattributed article: "Velvet Revolution; Successor of 1892 Bourgeois Newspaper an Immense Success After the Revolution"]

[Text] Miklos Chadima, a Prague musician has a problem: "In order to get a newspaper, you've got to get up at 0600, but as a musician, when do I ever get to bed before 1500?"

In Prague, when people stand in line early in the morning, it is not in front of grocery stores, it is at the vendors selling LIDOVE NOVINY (People's Newspaper).

The new hit, published twice a week, builds on a great tradition: In the first Czechoslovak Republic, a newspaper of the same name was the most respected press organ of the liberal, enlightened bourgeoisie—and the new newspaper hopes to be that again.

Its founders include the new president, Vaclav Havel, and his foreign minister, Jiri Dienstbier, but that was when LIDOVE NOVINY was still being reproduced on Xerox machines, in the underground.

The first issue after the "velvet revolution," as author Havel calls last November's anticommunist uprising,

came out in a gigantic printing of 600,000 copies—still too few for all who wanted to read it.

The editorial staff is a collection of those Czechoslovak intellectuals whom the Communists considered "unreliable" after 1968 and drove out of the universities, publishing houses, concert halls, and government into manual labor.

There probably is no [other] newspaper in Europe, a majority of whose staff consists of veteran furnace stokers, window washers, sausage sellers, bulldozer drivers, and storehouse workers.

"For 20 years I drove a bulldozer in the Bohemian Forest," says the current economics editor, Jan Hun. "I shared the trailer I slept in during the week with our current director, Vlada Prikazky." Besides his work on the bulldozer, he put out a small underground publication on economic matters.

These two represent the generation in their fifties and sixties on the staff who, very much in the old tradition, set the more reflective than condemnatory tone of the new LIDOVE NOVINY.

The newspaper was founded in 1892 but reached its high point between the two world wars. When the Nazis occupied Prague, one of their first official acts was to send free spirit Josef Capak, who along with his brother Karel had set LIDOVE NOVINY's intellectual tone, to a concentration camp, where he died of exhaustion.

In 1948 the Communists took over the newspaper and within a few years had run it down so badly that it had to close.

In 1968, during the Prague Spring, plans were made to revive it. Author Antonin Liehm was supposed to become editor in chief, the newspaper was to be housed where the dissolved censorship office had been. The Soviet invasion in August 1968 put a premature end to the plan. Liehm emigrated to Paris.

But the idea lived on. Human rights activists from Charter 77 circles decided in fall 1987 to publish the old newspaper, underground at first. Havel and Dienstbier lent their names as publishers, dissidents Jiri Ruml and Rudolf Zeman were the editors in chief. There were able to print and circulate 400 copies at a secret location. Recently found documents indicate that Prague's secret police placed the number of readers at 10,000 for each issue.

To protest the fact that they were compelled to publish illegally, the editors in chief listed their correct addresses on the masthead, the authors used their real names. Until summer 1989, Ruml had to pay a fine for every issue for "publication of material hostile to the state."

As the political situation grew tense and citizens of Prague, inspired by those of Leipzig, took to the streets to protest bankrupt real Socialism, then-Communist Party Boss Milos Jakes had both editors in chief arrested.



But LIDOVE NOVINY still came out. "Then more than ever, we didn't want to give in," says Jaroslav Kusy, who organized the emergency issue and has since become rector of Bratislava University.

Thanks to the pressure from the daily mass demonstrations, Ruml and Zeman were released from prison and cheered by a gigantic crowd at Prague's Letna Square.

Since then, the staff has been getting ready to begin publishing daily in April. However, there is not enough money and office equipment, equipment is obsolete, paper is rationed.

A foreign investor, British media giant Robert Maxwell's group, offered to help but wanted to turn the newspaper into a shallow tabloid. The staff refused and Maxwell realized that he could not make any money from advertisements in a country with as many shortages as Czechoslovakia.

The obvious solution—to simply take over the modern printing plant of the compromised Communist newspaper RUDE PRAVO, with its ultramodern Linotype computer system from West Germany—is contrary to the new government's legal principles: "We must never have expropriations again."

## HUNGARY

### Parties on Shape of Future Soviet-Hungarian Relations

90EC0306A Budapest DATUM in Hungarian  
18 Jan 90 p 3

[Statements by Dr. Geza Jeszenszky, member of the national board of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF); Tibor Baranyai, vice president of the Hungarian Social Democrat Party (MSZDP); Miklos Szabo, managing director of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ); and Imre Szokai, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and member of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP): "Weighing the Past and the Future"; taken by Katalin Kekesi and Lajos Pogonyi; date and occasion not given; first paragraph is DATUM introduction]

[Text] Determining contacts between the Soviet Union and Hungary and nurturing the good relationship between the two countries cannot be the privilege of any single party. The MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] and the opposition parties alike feel that the system of relationships between the two countries must be placed on new bases as soon as possible. That was why we felt it necessary to ask members of the various parties, how do they envision the relationship and contacts between the two countries; are there any anti-Soviet sentiments, and what kind, in Hungary; and what is the connection between the perestroika of Gorbachov and Hungary's democratization process?

### The Soviet Union Is Not a Paper Tiger, Either

[Jeszenszky] It is clear to everyone that the two countries differ in their size. At times, it appears that some people seem to forget this. The relationship between the two countries is not free of bad feelings, to say the least. As a historian, I feel that we must differentiate between the Soviet Union and the oppressive global empires of previous epochs. Even though the relationship between the Soviet Union and the neighboring small nations has been determined by global power considerations inherited from the Stalinist period, the peoples of the Soviet Union, including the Russian people, shared the burden of this attitude. Thus, even though the atrocities following the end of the Second World War and the 1956 intervention represent painful memories to many Hungarians, at the same time we must also sympathize with the long-suffering peoples of the Soviet Union.

We consider it necessary and feasible that, based on the interests of the Hungarian nation, we can create a mutually beneficial relationship. After all, even the Soviet Union would be better off dealing with a flourishing and independent country, instead of one that is the "appendage" of a great nation. Not long ago, Gorbachev said that Europe's future cannot be imagined without the existence of neutral countries. I believe that the existence of the Soviet-Hungarian treaty, which expires in 2005, does not mean that we cannot jointly agree to discuss the issue of Hungary's neutrality before that date. This, of course, does not mean that Hungary would immediately become a neutral nation. On the contrary, while the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] asserts that neutrality is necessary as long as military blocks exist, we are also aware of the fact that by now a certain balance has been created in Europe, which neither side wishes to see upset. As the German question illustrates, the world's leading politicians are not overly happy with sudden changes. The above statements may demonstrate that the MDF considers geopolitical factors very important. We do not see this as cautiousness or fear. We know that the Soviet Union is a great country and it is not a paper tiger. We must weigh our national interests and foreign contacts free of illusions and emotions. At this moment, our economic contacts are not good. We realize, however, that the Soviet Union will be an important economic partner for a Hungary that wishes to prosper. We must transform our relationships and, in a manner of speaking, we must conquer the Soviet market instead of getting out of it.

The opposition parties can play a great role, because for years our country has been an experimental ground not only for economic but political reforms. The success of our reforms can be used by Soviet reformers to bolster their arguments. From the point of view of Hungarian transformations, the initiation of Soviet perestroika was indispensable. I hope that the latter has become well established, and that Hungary's changes have proceeded to the point where a possible Soviet restoration could not reverse the Hungarian processes.

### **'We Are Rooting'**

[Baranyai] A small nation living in the shadow of a great one must be very conscious of the relationship existing between the two. In the economic sense, our relationship is burdened by such factors that our deliveries are greater or that trade within the CEMA is not based on global prices. This is not good; moreover, averaging the price of oil for five years and a ruble that is priced at 28 forints also harm our economy. It is time for us to start trading with each other using global rates.

It is possible that during the campaign there will be people who will try to garner a great many votes by using anti-Soviet demagoguery. Responsible opposition politicians, however, will have to realize that after the elections they will continue living in this country. Therefore, even though we will have plenty of domestic problems to solve, Hungary's foreign policy will have to be transformed in such a manner that it would not be suitable as a tool for agitation against either of the great powers. As a Social Democrat, I hold the view that we should not be beholden to either of the great powers. We must make more aggressive efforts to diversify our economic, cultural, and commercial contacts. This way, we can become independent and, in time, even neutral. We, Social Democrats, are rooting for the Soviet people and Gorbachev in the hope that they succeed in accomplishing their perestroika and in finding openings toward all mankind. Although we consider Gorbachev's reforms as the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, we realize that they will have a bearing on the future of all of Europe, including that of Hungary.

### **Two Irons in the Fire at the Same Time**

[Szabo] The most important aspect of the Hungarian-Soviet relationship is probably how the Gorbachev leadership will "adapt itself" to the transformation process in Hungary. Gorbachev's initiatives in foreign and domestic politics were decisive for the Hungarian transformation, and this background is an important condition for the democratization of our society. During Khrushchev's time, Kadarism provided the example. Today, Hungary is not the exemplary representative of the Gorbachev model, because our country is witnessing an entirely different process. We hope that the Soviet Union will be able to tolerate the Hungarian changes, and we will try to contribute to this with every means at our disposal. I agree with those who say that Hungary must reach the point from which the Soviet Union can only reverse the processes in our country by using the most primitive means. In any event, it is praiseworthy that the Soviet leadership did not attack the changes that have taken place in Hungary. At the same time, those organs of the Soviet media that set the tone never had and still do not have a good opinion of the developments in Hungary. For example, the Soviet leadership reacted in a most sensitive manner to the statements that were made at the reburial of Imre Nagy and his confederates, on October 23. It is also noteworthy that after the transformation of the Hungarian ruling party the

NOVOYE VREMYA picked Janos Berecz to interview. This shows that the Soviet leading circles keep two irons in the fire simultaneously. We would like to see Moscow approve of the Hungarian changes, because, as of now, its reactions are not always clear. As for the Soviet-Hungarian economic contacts, the main problem with those is that the two nations' collaboration does not prompt technological progress. In our view, energy dependency is an even greater problem, since the Soviet Union itself is struggling with an energy crisis.

Speaking of anti-Soviet attitudes, it should be noted that there is a great amount of anti-Americanism in the West, and still no country is destabilized. Hungary's opposition does not demonstrate anti-Soviet sentiment comparable to the anti-American feelings shown by the moderate left in the West. At the same time, it would be foolish to deny that there exists a certain anti-Soviet feeling deep in Hungarian society. The main reason for this, in my view, is that countries in the West never became as dependent on America as we have become on the Soviet Union. I see no danger in hearing occasional radical voices here and there. Radicalism is a part of a democratic atmosphere. If the country's political culture is crushed, then the passions and the subsurface anti-Soviet feelings will come to the fore in their naked and uncontrolled form. But this is the fault of the past 30-40 years. Such passionate prejudices must not be thwarted, because that would cause more harm. However, responsible opposition politicians are not inciting such passions.

The SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] would like to see Hungary as a neutral country, outside the Warsaw Treaty Organization. However, we do not wish to see Hungary leave the Organization in a unilateral manner and in confrontation with the Soviet Union. We would like to see a situation in which the Soviet Union would not consider it damaging to its political interests and its prestige if Hungary were to leave. We know that this is not the case at the moment, but it is not impossible in the future. As strange as it sounds, today it is the West that is worried about Hungary leaving the organization, because such a step would bring about destabilization.

### **We Must Base Our Actions on Shared Interests**

[Szokai] Up until the most recent times, Hungarian-Soviet relations have been determined by an absence of self-determination and the pressure of great power politics. The later factor is beginning to change, since the Soviet Union recognized that the mutual interdependence of countries is a noteworthy aspect of global politics. By an absence of self-determination, I understand that during the past 40 years the leaders of Hungarian foreign policy could not clearly set our country's global orientation and its priorities. There were many times in the past when our country was shuttled back and forth between various camps. These historical experiences must not be forgotten in the shaping of contacts. I would not consider it proper if our previous unilateral

dependency were replaced by an opposite kind of dependency. During the past 80 years, there existed in this country a massive anti-Russian feeling, then we saw the creation of a Fascistic theory of a Hungarian nation, followed by a period when anti-Soviet sentiments were covered over by an abstract ideal of friendship. All the while, repressed passions continued to survive. It is important for us to eliminate the exaggerations of ideology and abstract internationalism, both of which can be found even in anti-Soviet feelings. A Soviet-Hungarian relationship must be based on shared interests and interdependence. We must not forget that the Soviet Union is a great military power and possesses sizeable economic resources.

We must not ignore cultural contacts, or forget that the transformations taking place in the Soviet Union were indispensable for developing the Hungarian democratic transformation. We must make a clear distinction between interparty and interstate contacts. I consider it natural that in the future the Soviet Communist Party will maintain a balanced relationship with every left-of-center party in Hungary. We are in a position to turn the relationship between Hungary and the Soviet Union into a model to be emulated. Followers of the Gorbachev reforms and those of the Hungarian transformation have a mutual interest in each others' success. However, even in this area, there is a degree of asymmetry: Hungary's democratization process has reached the point where it has its own dynamism. A potential hesitation in the Soviet transformation could not halt the Hungarian process. Of course, the failure of perestroika would significantly hinder Hungary's democratization. If Hungary succeeds in creating a constitutional state and enters the road of economic consolidation, this would also improve Gorbachev's position.

As for anti-Soviet feelings, we should not claim that they are running wild in Hungary, even though they are very much alive in the depths of the community's subconscious. The factors behind them could be a lack of familiarity with each other, the absence of clearly defined interests, or even the fact that during the past hundred years there were great Hungarian initiatives that were defeated by Russian or Soviet interventions. At the same time, I am certain that no responsible party could allow the incitement of anti-Soviet sentiments within its ranks.

#### **Party of Generations—Pensioners and Family-Men Party Created**

*25000640C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
26 Jan 90 p 5*

[Article by "K. J. T.": "Yet Another Party Popped Up"]

[Text] Look, how many decent people dig into the garbage bins every morning! Slowly we are reaching a point where pensioners will fight over garbage bins, yesterday's "international news conference" was told. The news conference was held in the presence of six

party leaders and four journalists at the Szofia Restaurant by the Party of Generations—Pensioners and Family-Men's Party.

Economic policy thus far, and the shrill statements of some parties, did not relieve our miseries; they increased them instead, according to Dr. Vilmos Michaletzky, head of the election office.

Pensioners can count only on themselves in enforcing their interests, this is why we decided to form a party. Their organization has already about 3,500 members. They are going to run almost 40 candidates in the elections, and they are counting on at least 10 or 15 mandates in the new parliament.

The notice of voter registration/nominating slip and the ballot form will be our weapons in our struggle against misery, Michaletzky said. We may break out of misery only if pensioners vote for our candidates. They have developed a program, and in their view they have found medication for society's troubles.

"Financial support of our program will be provided by an in-depth transformation of the National Bank's monetary policies and the management of the budget, thus financing and organizing increased production and service provisions. This surplus should suffice to realize the rapid uplift of the standard of living for generations: for children, families, and pensioners. Only those persons can call this social demagoguery who are unable to wrestle the problems of economic management," the program proclaims. The party will hold its first grand meeting on Saturday in Budapest in the law school building of the Lorand Eotvos University of Sciences.

#### **Royalist Party Established**

*25000640B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
29 Jan 90 p 4*

[Article by Jozsef Bartha Szabo]

[Excerpts] The Hungarian Legitimists' Party was established. [passage omitted] Provisional Chairman Laszlo Palos stated that the legitimists had a place on the Hungarian political palette ever since ancient times. Their program stands for Christian national unity, and for this reason they are thinking in terms of the Hungarian character, rather than the territory of the country. They intend to invoke the Doctrine of the Sacred Crown as a barrier to reprivatization, on the basis of which the country's land cannot be sold, it can be leased at most. They stressed that they are fighting on the side of a kingdom and of justice, and they would like to prevent our grandchildren from becoming indebted. They do not intend to establish an organization which calls for reckoning for the crimes of the past 40 years. Nevertheless, they find it important that all those who thus far advocated equality from high above should be equal to the average Hungarian person in terms of pension, and personal and real property. As for the form of statehood, they do not by all means insist on a monarchy, but they

would regard it as appropriate if in the future the title of the president of the Republic would be "palatine." Insofar as laws are concerned: They would like to extend the former constitution of the nobility to cover everything, because, according to the provisional chairman, nothing better than that exists today. Their registered membership numbers 15, and "otherwise" 150, but the latter are secret members, because they want to protect the descendants of historic families. In the course of elections they will not seek opportunities for vocal political role playing, nevertheless despite this fact they hope that one or two candidates running for representative mandates will win. Based on the rules provided in the Golden Edict of the year 1222, they regard Otto von Habsburg as their legitimate leader. Asked if Otto von Habsburg is aware of this fact, Palos said: "We told his secretary already, but we will soon notify him directly...."

## YUGOSLAVIA

### Role of Milosevic in Vlasi Arrest Alleged

90EB0183A Zagreb *DANAS* in Serbo-Croatian  
27 Oct 89 p 8

[Article by Kresimir Meler: "How I Arrested Vlasi"; reprinted from *TELEKS*, 12 October 1989]

[Text] "The removal and arrest of Azem Vlasi were planned and prepared as early as the 8th session of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC [League of Communists], when he opposed the methods by which the policy of the new Serbian leadership was being conducted. The right opportunity for this did not offer itself until the spring, however, and that was after several incidents initiated by provocateurs."

These are the words of an employee of the State Security Service [SDB] in Kosovo, and also an Albanian, who participated himself, as he states, in the preparations for and in the actual arrest of Azem Vlasi, a former member of the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] Central Committee and the head of the Provincial Committee of the Kosovo LC. For his own safety, he wishes to remain anonymous.

The beginning of the end for Vlasi started at the beginning of last July, when Rahman Morina (then the Kosovo Secretary for Internal Affairs), Dragoljub Cerovic, the Serbian Undersecretary for Justice and Administration, Jusuf Karakushi, Morina's deputy, Rajko Calovic, the head of the Kosovo SDB [State Security Service], Remzi Kolgeci, and several other people from the Republic Secretariat for Internal Affairs and the Serbian SDB met at Serbia's Republic Secretariat for Internal Affairs. At the meeting, Cerovic warned those present that the Serbian leadership, and especially Slobodan Milosevic, were dissatisfied with the development of the situation in Kosovo: "Comrade Milosevic sent this message: You know about his ambitions. You also know, however, what he is like when

someone opposes him. Vlasi did precisely that by refusing to submit and to consent to the elimination of certain of the Province's rights. You also know that the Serbian Constitution cannot be adopted without the consent of the Kosovo Assembly, and that Vlasi has great influence in Kosovo. Consequently, think of something, as soon as possible!"

And the SDB operatives began to think of things. To start with, at the "fraternity and unity" rallies that were in full swing at that time, speakers "from the people" began to appear (actually employees and collaborators of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs), with "verified" stories about the "conspiracy of the Kosovo, Croatian, and Slovene peoples against Serbia," in which Azem Vlasi naturally had the main role. "Witnesses" also appeared who "knew" that Vlasi had already been active against Yugoslavia for many years. Then, for the first time, one could also hear the slogans: "Azem, get your blanket ready, a cell is waiting for you," "Arrest Vlasi," and so forth. All these slogans were devised and perfected under the vigilant supervision of Rahman Morina and Rajko Calovic. They also sent telex messages to the militia to inform them about the areas where the rallies were being held, so that no measures would be taken against those who were singing and shouting, according to our interlocutor.

In addition to the rallies, there was one more possibility in all of Serbia: organizing a Serbian-Montenegrin rally in front of the Assembly and the Provincial Committee of the Kosovo LC, and at it, simply overthrowing Vlasi and the rest of the "separatist leadership." That was too risky, however: in response to that proposal, Calovic answered his interlocutor: "But listen, Solevic can do that with Sparavalo (Mica Sparavalo is a former UDBA [State Security Administration] major, and a present employee of the SDB—comment by author), but what will we do if the Albanians begin to defend themselves? I do not believe that we can count on the militia here, they are likewise Siptars [pejorative term for Albanians], and anything could happen." After brief consideration, Calovic's interlocutor agreed that the September meeting in Pristina should not take place. In Pristina and Belgrade, however, people were seeking another and much more effective plan. They proposed that Vlasi be expelled from the LCY. Several secret meetings of Serbian leaders with individual members of the LCY Central Committee working group that was studying Vlasi's responsibility (it should be stated that all of those members were from the eastern parts of Yugoslavia) showed the result: "Tito's young man" was expelled from the LCY Central Committee with a suspiciously close majority of votes. The path toward a final settling of accounts was clear.

The Kosovo LC Provincial Committee's Presidium met on 17 November 1988. The main point on the agenda was dealing with Presidium member Azem Vlasi and removing Kagushe Jashari from his duties. Rahman Morina and Remzi Kolgeci, apparently upset, sat in the front row. That was not unusual: several hours before the

meeting, they had a joint conversation with "external employees" of the SDB, and now everything depended on two people: Julijana Gasic, and Milivoj Milosevic.

Morina explained it beautifully:

"Julijana, if the miners do not want to go to Pristina, then convince them that they have to do it if they love Yugoslavia. You are the president of the Stari Trg LC OK [Regional Committee], and they trust you. Milovoje, you, however, have to see Vllasi where he never was. Don't entangle things by accident, because you will end up like Vllasi."

The meeting began, and proceeded mostly according to the planned scenario. Something that no one could have foreseen occurred, however: instead of mass rallies beginning, telegrams began to arrive with expressions of support, even from Serbs. The miners had not left yet. For that reason, the provocateurs at the Student Center were more successful: they infiltrated the students who were shouting "Tito—party," and began to shout "Kosovo—republic!" The militia officers faced a difficult dilemma, but they nevertheless found a solution: when it became obvious that the "republicans" could get beaten up, they "arrested" them. Students later saw these people in militia uniforms. At the same time, Julijana Gasic was under heavy pressure. Aziz Abrashi and Burhan Kavaja, supervisors at Stari Trg, had almost persuaded the miners not to go to Pristina, where workers from other collectives had already begun to gather. The miners stood in front of the administration office and did not know what to do. Then Julijana Gasic stood in front of them: "Let's go to Pristina and show them what miners are." There was no longer any force that could have stopped them.

The miners came across several "special forces troops" on the way to Pristina, but they withdrew, as if on command. At the same time, in the semidarkness, Milivoj Milosevic "saw" Vllasi guiding the workers toward Pristina, at a distance of about 20 meters, to boot. In that way he and Julijana Gasic successfully completed their tasks... Also successful was Gani Jashari, who had quarreled with Vllasi even earlier. He passed everything that he heard in a private conversation with Vllasi (even that every people has a right to assemble) to the SDB. Protest meetings succeeded each other for three days, but there was no reason for Vllasi's arrest on this occasion either. The situation stabilized, which did not exactly inspire the Serbian leadership.

After this came February and the miners' strike at Stari Trg. Julijana Gasic obtained a visible role once again: all of the important work came through her, and again she "greeted" the workers—in short, she did everything she could to make the miners' strike successful. Then 24 February also came. Azem rang at the door of his neighbor Hysen Prekazi, in order to invite him to study again the report on the visit to Kosovo by Milosevic and Suvar. Azem then suddenly rose and said, "I am going to the miners at Stari Trg!"

Several hours before that, he talked with Morina: "The miners' demands are unacceptable, and therefore, you have to tell them that and then request that they leave the pit. It is only after that that we can talk," Morina said to Vllasi over the telephone.

"I cannot persuade the miners to leave the pit like that. I have to tell them to go outside because they are in great danger."

"You have to tell them what I told you. What they are doing is serious pressure against the organs and institutions of the system," persisted the chief policeman and top communist of Kosovo.

"I would not do it in that way. I would try to persuade them in a human manner, specifically, by saying that their lives are in danger."

Morina: "You know, our conversation is over. If we decide that it would be good for you to go there, I will telephone you."

Vllasi was observed leaving his apartment. His departure was immediately reported to Morina, who in turn immediately notified someone, Haxhi Jonuzi, the mine's technical director. "If Vllasi comes, let him into the pit, and do not lose sight of him. We have to catch him now."

Knowing that he had a considerable number of technical mistakes on his conscience, Jonuzi did not hesitate. Vllasi's dossier was filled.

Finally, on 28 February, the Pristina Secretariat for Internal Affairs sent a telegram to the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs, and in it, said that "Azem Vllasi was preparing to flee to West Germany," and that it had discovered "headquarters documents" according to which Vllasi had been preparing for the secession of Kosovo and had organized the rallies in November and the strike in February, and finally, he had been preparing armed resistance. SDB employees and members of the Belgrade LC University Conference organized a meeting behind the SFRY Assembly... The ones in the front ranks, and the most vocal, were the policemen, who were the first ones to shout "Treason, treason," and "Arrest Vllasi!" Milosevic spoke the same evening, and promised Vllasi's arrest. The decree or order for Azem Vllasi's arrest was signed by Rahman Morina and Remzi Kolgeci... As his key witnesses, the prosecutor named Julijana Gasic, Milivoj Milosevic, and Haxhi Jonuzi.

#### **Lawyer Outlines Internal Affairs Organs Interference in Kosovo Trials**

*90EB0178A Zagreb POLET in Serbo-Croatian  
10 Nov 89 p 10*

[Interview with defense attorney Fazli Balaj by Bleri Shala: "Shooting Galleries"; date and place not given]

[Text] [POLET] A rather interesting item in your biography reads that for 14 years you were a prosecuting

attorney and then reversed your shingle to become a defense attorney. How do you explain this reversal?

[Balaj] Well, you see, I am neither the first nor the last to do something such as this here in Kosovo. The main reason is that after 1981 I was unable to adjust to the new conditions of the public prosecution system in our country. Specifically, as a judge I also had to convict intellectuals Arif Demolli and Muhamet Pirraku, even though neither of them was proved to be guilty of anything. The writer Demolli was sentenced to two years on Goli otok [Bare Island] because he allegedly "incited counterrevolution in 1981" in a short story he published two years before these events occurred, and the historian Muhamet Pirraku was sentenced on the same grounds, in that he collected "Kacak songs" glorifying this Albanian movement of the period between the two World Wars, even though Pirraku did so in the exercise of his profession. It is important to note that Article 230 of the Serbian Penal Code (punishing "the brutal behavior of a group or individuals in demonstrations") was still in effect at the very beginning of the 'political trials' in 1981. This article was much closer to the correct judgment of these events. However, two to three weeks later we were ordered to switch everything to 'counterrevolution' and to try the demonstrators on this basis. All these circumstances induced me to leave the public prosecution system and become a defense attorney. To put it simply, I could no longer function as I had.

[POLET] Your career as an attorney is filled with 'political trials' of an 'enemy from positions of Albanian nationalism and separatism.' How does the Kosovo legal system operate in these instances?

[Balaj] How it operates can be inferred also from the fact that I as attorney did not have a single successful trial, one in which the defendant was pronounced innocent. Listen, it is very difficult to describe in a few words all the irregularities taking place in our 'injustice system,' as I venture to term it. Take a single example. At the recommendation of the public prosecutor, the examining magistrate directs the Secretariat of Internal Affairs [SUP], specifically the State Security Service [SDS], to carry out individual investigative operations, including interrogation of accused persons under temporary arrest. This procedure is completely illegal. The criminal procedure law does not contain a single provision authorizing such SDS interrogation. And in court practice in Kosovo, this assignment is made as an order rather than as a court decision. Accordingly, as attorneys here we are not entitled to complain.

[POLET] What are the specific repercussions of this involvement of security personnel?

[Balaj] From the legal viewpoint an accused has the right to remain silent, that is, not to present his defense during interrogation. What happens in this case, however, is that the examining magistrate arbitrarily decides to have the accused 'worked over' by the security people. Naturally, the accused ends up singing, not just talking. Cases

in which an accused remains silent are less common, because after all the majority of accused persons want to present their defense.

[POLET] Is beating of accused persons 'on a legal basis' the 'normal state of affairs in Kosovo'?

[Balaj] Of course. Many of my clients have complained that they were tortured until they were unconscious in an effort to compel their "testimony." In several instances we even testified on the basis of medical findings to the effect that instructions to the SDS had been issued. Nothing came of this, however. Even members of accused persons' families refrained from making accusations against persons who 'exceeded their authority,' out of fear that doing so might tend to increase the mistreatment and beating.

[POLET] And yet we heard that you made such an accusation against four SDS inspectors in Prizren.

[Balaj] Yes. This was the very difficult and disagreeable case of a teacher (a graduate economist), Xhemajli Berisha, of the village of Dusanovo near Prizren. While he was in solitary confinement, Berisha was taken to the Prizren SUP building and interrogated there around the clock. On 6 April Xhemajli Berisha committed suicide by jumping out of a third-floor window of the building because of the brutal treatment. The official reports even confirmed that it was a question of a suicide during interrogation. On behalf of Berisha's family I filed a complaint on 3 August with the public prosecutor, asking that he proceed on the basis of Article 36 (4) of the Kosovo Penal Code punishing the offense of "inducing a person to commit suicide." However, rather than demand an investigation, the public prosecutor rejected the complaint as groundless, and I filed a petition with the examining magistrate of the Prizren Municipal Court asking that the four SDB inspectors (all of them ethnic Albanians) who interrogated Berisha be investigated. I filed this application on 29 September, and I still have received no reply whatever. At the same time, Xhemajli's brother Skender Berisha was arrested and will be tried under the famous Article 114, on the grounds that, as an employee of Printex (in Prizren), he led a column of workers who walked to Pristina during the protests in November of last year.

[POLET] And so we come to the current trials, held daily in Pristina, of the participants in the demonstrations and the 'leaders of the counterrevolution stage' in November, February, and March.

[Balaj] Yes. Because I am a defense attorney in many of the cases you have referred to, I can tell you something about these trials. We have the specific trial of five employees of the Obilice thermoelectric power plant, whose indictment charges them with following a 'counterrevolutionary line,' because of a one-hour strike on 28 March 1989 and the allegation that they said 'it would be a good idea to shut off the current.'

We have trials against 10 participants in the demonstrations in Urosevac in March 1989 (when there was no shooting), although the main piece of evidence offered in court was a photograph taken by SDB personnel. Even a layman knows that photographs cannot be used as evidence in a court trial.

Or again, how are we to explain the fact that the evidence offered of 'counterrevolutionary activity' by my clients has been public and official discussion in the course of debate on amendment of the Serbian constitution, or a telegram supporting the demands of the Stari Trg miners during the strike in February?

Stari Trg, Vllasi, and the 14 other 'destroyers of the foundations of the state' naturally come as a sort of culmination of these trials.

[POLET] In the Vllasi trial you are defending Lazar Krasniqi (former director at the Obilice thermoelectric power plant), Sinan Kurteshi (a mine technician in Stari Trg), Mensur Fejza (mine operations director), and the miner Avdi Uka. What are we to infer from the events connected with Stari Trg?

[Balaj] I will be stating nothing new when I say that this is a political trial. Simply put, this is a trial imposed on the police and the legal system by the political system. The reasoning followed was that they would form a group, imprison the 'leaders,' and somehow everything would be settled during the investigation and the indictment would be legally valid. However, none of the witnesses interrogated directly accuse any of the defendants. Take the case of Lazar Krasniqi, for example. For four months he was held in solitary confinement in Pristina. He was interrogated around the clock, even though there was nothing controversial in his answers. They tried in vain, on 12 June, to associate him with the Stari Trg group even though he had no connection with the events at that mine. What are we to say about the fact that the internal affairs authorities even tried to blackmail his wife (while Krasniqi was in solitary confinement), to have her write him a letter begging him to confess everything demanded of him, because by doing so he would allegedly receive a milder sentence and be released very soon. The case of the miner Avdi Uka is even more drastic. The man has only a fourth-grade education. He can barely sign his name, but the indictment charges him with taking part in the drawing up of the demands in the February strike. The charge against him runs to only three lines, but because of it Uka may be sentenced to death. The truth is that Uka is entirely unable to pay an attorney, and so I am defending him free of charge. His family of 11 is living on the 70 million old dinars he is paid for past work. And this will last only until the trial. Then this financial assistance will be discontinued. And Fejza and Kurteshi are charged with supporting the miners and maintaining order in the mine during the strike. And they apparently had no need to go home while the miners were trapped 800 meters underground.

[POLET] What will happen at the trial?

[Balaj] I would not like to prejudice the trial. At the present we do not even know when it will be held (the interview was conducted on the evening of the day when it was announced that the trial would begin on 30 October—POLET), and it would be difficult to predict anything with certainty. The only certainty is that the court system and the police have been compromised; they are judging in accordance with the decisions and desires of certain known individuals.

[POLET] Inasmuch as attempts are being made in almost all parts of the country to do something to rescind Article 133 or to amend Article 114 of the controversial sections of the Penal Code of Yugoslavia, what is being done in this area in Kosovo?

[Balaj] Nothing. The same situation prevails as in 1981, insofar as the courts and the 'legal injustice system' are concerned. We defense attorneys are writing complaints. We are trying to defend persons from attacks by the political system and the police, but we are obviously not succeeding.

[POLET] Then why are you doing this?

[Balaj] Someone has to do it. And we do hope that something will change for the better, even though the trials in Kosovo will be held under the Serbian penal code. And people still say that Kosovo has retained its autonomy.

### Activities of Albanian 'Emigrants' in Slovenia

90EB0183B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian  
27 Oct 89 p 9

[Article by Vladimir Spasic: "Emigrants in Their Own Country"]

[Text] The Golden Boat cafe-pizzeria, about 200 meters from the monument to Presern in the center of Ljubljana, has been an informal gathering place for Albanian migrants in Slovenia for several months now. The "hotbed of irredentism in separatist Slovenia," as it is often called south of Zagreb, consists of the Migjeni Cultural Society of Albanians in Ljubljana, and the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights in Kosovo. Both the Society and the Committee are multiethnic. A considerable number of Slovenes are also active in them, in addition to Albanians, and so far one Montenegrin is also registered among the "newcomers." The members, however, try to make a strict distinction between the Society and the Committee, and do not like equating cultural activities with humanitarian ones, although they are aware that today both necessarily touch upon politics.

"All of our involvement with politics within the Society consists of individual articles in our newspaper ALTER-NATIVA about current social issues," stated Naim Maloku, the Society's president, who took annual leave that day because of our arrival.



"It is the first time that someone outside of Slovenia has not called us separatists and irredentists a priori, and has come to Ljubljana to see what we are really doing."

#### Newspaper ALTERNATIVA

The Migjeni Cultural Society, named after the Albanian poet Milosh Gyergy Nikolli "Migjeni," was founded on 21 June, and had about 250 members at its very first meeting. There are not many more of them today, since, because the Society's charter and other documents have not yet gone through the official procedure, the Society still does not formally exist. The literary, musical, dramatic, translation, and athletic sections are already working actively, however. It was unusual to see Salih Kabashi, the president of the literary section, a professor of the Albanian language (today he is employed as a janitor at Slovenijales) talking, full of enthusiasm, about the society's newspaper ALTERNATIVA.

"The newspaper is trilingual: Albanian, Slovene, and Serbo-Croatian, but we are also open to the other languages of the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia. In the first issue, we also had a letter in Italian, and now we have also offered to collaborate with the Hungarian club in Ljubljana... We are primarily a cultural society, and we engage in politics only to the extent that culture has been politicized. Today Ismail Kadare, the Albanian writer, has been deleted from textbooks. Sometimes we publish his poems, but we consider that primarily a cultural act and not a political one, as it is viewed in Serbia. The question that arises is the financing of the Society, which, although it does not have offices of its own, has already published three issues of ALTERNATIVA."

"The Society is financed by membership fees and voluntary contributions, exclusively from Yugoslavia," stated Fadil Demiri, the student who is the Society's secretary. The printing is financed primarily by Albanian pastry-cooks from Slovenia.

#### High Tide of Intellectuals

Today about 30,000 Albanians live in Slovenia, including seasonal workers. Many of them are already second-generation Slovenes, so that the need to organize instruction in the Albanian language arises more and more frequently. The high tide of intellectuals from Kosovo that came after March 1989 was especially welcome to the Albanians who have been guest workers in Slovenia for 20 years or more, since now it is becoming possible to fulfill a Slovene initiative already about 10 years old for organizing instruction in the Albanian language in certain schools. For the time being, it will take place under the auspices of the Migjeni Society. Consequently, the vital assistance of the pastry-cooks to the Society should not be received with surprises and associated with the so-called Albanian pastry-cook Mafia that is being written about in the context of an Albanian special war against Serbia, because the organization of a competition in Albanian today is the

only chance for a Fadil to remain a Fadil and not a Janez [common Slovene first name].

"You probably know that the three of us served sentences," said Naim, who was formerly a captain in the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], and who lives today in a military section.

"Today that is often cited in the newspapers, OSLOBODJENJE, POBJEDA, and the newspapers published in Serbia... and the Society is always attacked with words like, 'what can it be like, if people like that are heading it.' But no one has ever attacked any article in ALTERNATIVA with arguments, and used it as an example of how we are irredentists. The only thing that is used is how we were convicted, and that is a different story. What sort of irredentist can I be, if my best friend in the Focan prison, in addition to 35 other Albanians, was a Serb, and if the first person to come to my wife's aid when things were hardest for her was not an Albanian woman, but a Serb? I assert even today that Kosovo is and should remain in Yugoslavia, and that it has no future outside of it, but not in any sort of Yugoslavia, but rather in one that with equality for everyone."

#### Cases

The heads of Migjeni are inevitably perceived today as political emigres in their own country. Thus there was a dramatic impact a few months ago in Slovenia from the case of an Albanian who traveled to Ljubljana, threw away his identity card, and asked to remain in Slovenia; and the case of six children whose father was sentenced to eight years in prison, and whose mother died, and who simply turned up one morning in Ljubljana.

"So far attempts have been made to solve that problem of Albanian emigres on a case-by-case basis, but sometime Slovenia will have to enter into negotiations with their parent republic in order to settle this permanently," stated Jasa Lukic-Zlobec, the "strongest" Slovene among the Albanians, and the person who deserves the credit for Slovenia's beginning to think differently back in the mid-1980's about the problem of Albanians in Yugoslavia. It happens frequently today that emigres come to the Society's address at the Federation of Cultural Organizations at 2 Krekov Square in Ljubljana, expecting assistance in finding an apartment or employment, although the Society is only temporarily using offices at that address. Most of the most prominent Albanians in the Society no longer dare to travel to Kosovo. The last one, two months ago, was Salih Kabashi, but as part of the delegation from the International Federation for Human Rights in Paris, which has regular contacts with UNESCO, the French government, and the Council of Europe.

#### Live and Dead

"I have the impression that we would be immediately arrested if we returned," said Kabashi. "The problem is that, for the authorities in Serbia and Kosovo, Slovenia is becoming what Tirana, Zurich, and the Vatican once



were. We know that the newspapers have always been the first ones to start a witch hunt when someone had to be arrested. That was the case with Vllasi. And so far, the newspapers have really written all kinds of things about the three of us in the Society's Presidency. One can therefore assume that if we had been in Kosovo in March, all three of us would have been arrested. It is not difficult for them to find some charge. Some of us were convicted earlier on contrived charges. And while I was with the delegation in Kosovo, the militia followed us nonstop. Later they even began to walk ahead of us. We did not have any problems directly, but as soon as we entered Kosovo, it could be seen that something was seething. The authorities there consider us to be very dangerous, although we are not doing dangerous things. For example, when people came to ask for me at the reception desk, instead of the reception clerks' answering, people from the SDB came up to them and said, 'So, you are looking for Kabashi? He's not here. He died. He won't be around any more.' And at the Pec brewery a few days ago it was written that only 10 percent of the workers were not Albanians, and that although the director was good, they wanted to get rid of him and appoint a Serb. We wanted to go and take a look, and talk with the people at the brewery, to see what the truth was. But when we came to the entrance, two SDB officers were sitting there and watching who went in and who went out, so that the director with whom we wanted to talk did not dare to appear. We could not even reach him by telephone. If I had not gone with the delegation, I am convinced that I would have been arrested. We in the Society, however, intend to work regardless of that. In the Pristina opstina committee, for instance, they say that the biggest problems for differentiation and stabilization of the situation in Kosovo are Ibrahim Rugova, the Migjeni Cultural Society, and Salih Kabashi, who, as you know from OSLOBODJENJE, is the alpha and omega of Albanian nationalists in Ljubljana. Or a sentence, again from the opstina committee, that I 'liked' very much: 'But let them not think... Differentiation will go there as well, and will reach them, and so they will come quietly...'

### Distance From Politics

How did the society arise? When the state of emergency was introduced in Kosovo, there were also great social tensions among the Albanians in Slovenia. More and more often, ideas were heard about organizing large demonstrations of Albanians in Ljubljana. Since the "irredentist leaders" felt that politics was still not created in the street, a meeting was organized at the municipal Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia [SAWPY] in Ljubljana, at which it was jointly decided that one should start to settle the question of the Albanians in Slovenia primarily as a social problem. One of several proposals also dealt with founding an Albanian cultural society in Ljubljana to promote them in a positive way as one of the increasingly more present segments of Slovene society. One of the reasons why the

society wanted to distance itself from politics was certainly the existence of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights in Kosovo. Although the Committee itself was not organized as one of the numerous marginal political groups on the Slovene scene, surely its very existence and its work through the gathering and publication of what Naim, Fadil, and Salih, as members of the Committee, assert are exclusively verified reports, have political significance. That is particularly relevant if one takes into account the fact that Slovenia is still the only area in Yugoslavia where Albanians are trying to articulate themselves as a "Yugoslav political subject, and not just as an object," as Naim stated.

### Zagreb Case

The attempt to organize an Albanian students' society in Zagreb, under the auspices of the University Conference of the Croatian Socialist Youth League, failed, and the doors of SAWPY are closed for now, so that the Slovene Albanians think that the process of the social advancement of Albanians in Croatia has been halted for the time being. All of that together says more about the incompetence of the republic leadership of SAWPY than about its desire not to "make waves" in Croatia, because the Kosovo question, which has crystallized the Yugoslav crisis, is finally threatening, under the new guise of Serbian and Croatian nationalism, to swallow up Croatia itself.

### Slovene Activist Interviewed by Belgrade Paper

90EB0166A Belgrade MLADOST in Serbo-Croatian  
20 Nov 89 pp 16-18

[Interview with Igor Bavcar, chairman of Slovene Committee for Protection of Human Rights, by Dragoslav Grujic: "Democracy or Revolution"; date and place not given; first paragraph is MLADOST introduction]

[Text] Our interviewee trained for the militia, then became chairman of the Committee for Protection of Human Rights, which has only a single mission, that of revealing the full truth of the Ljubljana Trial (of Jansa and others). He was the electoral candidate for the presidency of Slovenia who received the most votes in the communities, but he did not become a member of the collective presidential body. He set himself the goal of discovering many things, as did Magellan. He set out on a quest for a lawful government, democracy, the rule of law. At present he is familiar with and talks about only Slovenia. He is employed by the CASOPIS ZA KRITIKU ZNANOSTI (Journal for Criticism of Science).

[MLADOST] What do the Slovene programs have in common? Is it permissible to speak of a common program of the united Slovene opposition?

[Bavcar] To the extent that I am familiar with this program, it is difficult to speak of something common. I believe that the current period, one that I would term a period of exaggerated concern over details, will continue for some time to come. This concern over details has its

roots in history and is based on the political culture of the Slovenes, but its fundamental reason is the nature of the political system established after the war, its development as a monolithic and monopolistic political system. Now that the political arena has recently been opened up, suddenly all the differences which for many years were suppressed have crowded into it, and all these different political currents are demanding a legitimacy of their own. What is in store for us is a redrawing of the political map of the Slovene political arena. In addition to the experience of a one-party system, there is another reason for the diversity of the alternative political scene. I have in mind the existence of other experience outside the conventional party experience. This is the experience discussed today under the heading of new social movements. It is also the experience of our Committee.

### The SSOS as Marketing

[MLADOST] In my opinion, the aggregate results achieved by the Slovene political opposition are negative. Everything that it has done has worked to its detriment, and the official political system and its structure have received the benefit. Can we say that the entire commitment by the opposition has solidified the position of the current government and has secured its legitimacy?

[Bavcar] Yes, I agree with you. That is, I agree to the extent that what you say refers to the Committee. Let us get back to the matter of our documents, specifically to the last statement to the effect that the highest score in this entire game has been rung up precisely by the one who is skilled in this process in one way or another and has managed very skilfully to turn this process to his own account.

[MLADOST] Can the existing 'programs' be criticized for being a collection of declarations and wishes rather than effective campaign documents that can be used to gain power in the elections?

[Bavcar] Yes, but you must know that they have neither the experience nor the mechanisms of power and that under the existing system they can make themselves heard only in this declarative manner.

[MLADOST] Is this not agreement to the role played in political life with the previous government taking the lead?

[Bavcar] But any other approach to power is revolution. The only democratic way to power is through democratic elections. The policy of the current government, and above all of the Socialist Alliance of Working People and its chairman Smole, is constantly to create the impression that we are all individuals, that we can all take part in politics, while in reality all essential political questions and all key positions remain in the hands of the previous power holders.

[MLADOST] Is it possible that the forthcoming elections in Slovenia will be played out in a similar manner?

[Bavcar] I think so, but the results of these elections depend on what will happen between the present and the time they are held. To a great extent they depend on the election technique, the electoral law, the law on citizens' associations, and similar laws that are to be enacted before the election. But what in my opinion is important is that the importance of the elections themselves should not be exaggerated. In view of all that has been said up to the present, I believe that in one sense these elections are being held too quickly. But if the opposition should win a significant share of the votes, possibly even more than one-half, its greatest error would then be to assume a position in the government.

[MLADOST] Is this a sort of criticism of the Youth League of Slovenia [SSOS], which believes that it will come to power?

[Bavcar] It is. In this organization it is a question primarily of political marketing. When I say this, I especially have in mind the Polish situation, which one cartoonist illustrated in the most graphic way imaginable by drawing a pilot emerging from a cockpit and saying to Walesa seated in the passenger compartment, "well, you have waited a long time to fly a plane and now the controls are finally in your hands."

### III-Considered Separation

[MLADOST] When you now compare Yugoslavia with the countries of true socialism, which comparison do you find to be more appropriate, with Poland or with Hungary?

[Bavcar] I myself have drawn a comparison between Poland and Slovenia, but I think that Yugoslavia is something entirely different. I believe that it resembles nothing other than Yugoslavia.

There is no way in which Yugoslavia can resolve its current conflicts. The only thing I see in its future is a continuation of these conflicts. I see no possibility of resolving this situation, and above all not the one envisioned by the League of Socialist Youth (ZSM) activists, who at their last congress used the slogan "the last party is coming." If it comes to the last party, I would not want to be part of it, because there will be all sorts of things in it. There will also be what there is the most of in the Balkans, violence.

The only future for Yugoslavia is for the governing elements to come to an agreement which would lead to a confederation or continuation of the conflicts into the unforeseeable future. Nor do I believe in quick fixes in politics. Democracy has never won out when quick fixes have been involved. This is why I always confine my thinking to terms of Slovenia.

[MLADOST] Does this mean that you see no significance to the linking of the Slovene opposition to other opposition associations in Yugoslavia?

[Bavcar] On the contrary, such linking is of very great importance. After all, the Committee took the step of linking together all the committees in Yugoslavia which involve the protection of human rights. We in Slovenia have our own alternative coordination which brings all these associations together, but our experience shows that all these organizations are occupied primarily with their own problems, from internal conflicts to organization and financing. We in Slovenia are faced with rallying alternative groups, and above all rallying around the questions relating to the electoral campaign.

Currently nets are being cast wide to catch the persons who will agree to have their party put forward a candidate. Another major question around which the entire opposition will probably unite concerns enactment of the law on elections and of the financing of political organizations.

All these factors are reasons to disregard links with the rest of Yugoslavia. The times are such in Slovenia today that the question of association with Yugoslavia is not on the agenda, and to judge by the state of mind and political advantage it may even be said that it is better not to associate with Yugoslavia and enter into contrived arrangements that have not been thoroughly thought out.

[MLADOST] Does Yugoslavia need Slovenia and does Slovenia need Yugoslavia?

[Bavcar] Before these current differences and conflicts, that is, 2 years ago, when these differences had not been sufficiently articulated, before Milosevic's concept had been so sharply defined, before it was clear what is happening in Slovenia, in short, before these differences arose or while they were still insignificant, I believed that it would be possible to arrive at a consensus about the meaning of Yugoslavia in a very short time. Now I do not believe in such a consensus at all. The overall current situation is such as to preclude any consensus. This impossibility was caused on the one hand by the total incompatibility of the republic concepts which are advocated, ...

[MLADOST] In a situation such as this, is it possible to speak of the existence of Yugoslavia at all?

[Bavcar] Why not? Really, doesn't Yugoslavia exist? It is possible for it to exist even with two or more political systems. Moreover, this incompatibility does not at all preclude coexistence. I tell you quite frankly that the only future I see for this country is through organization as a confederation. After all, in a sense that is what it is today, but it has not yet been formalized. We even have different currencies. A million dinars in Ljubljana means something entirely different from what it does in Belgrade, and this million is worth about a third as much in Pristina. Consequently, we already have different currencies. And these are factors that must be taken into consideration in any serious discussion.

[MLADOST] The current political situation may be said to be characterized above all by declarations. You people

in Slovenia have had two major declarations, the Majska Deklaracija [May Declaration] and the Temeljna Listina [Fundamental Document]. What is the point of them?

[Bavcar] The Committee did not sign either of them.

[MLADOST] One might say that they were not signed by the citizens of Slovenia either, because only 100,000 people placed their signatures on it.

[Bavcar] This small number of signatures was due to the major conflict in progress at that time.

[MLADOST] I would say rather that the reason was the awareness of the Slovene citizen, who by not signing expressed his resistance to manipulations and party games. I would say rather that the reason was abstinence from partisanship.

[Bavcar] That I do not know. However, Slovenes are not that uncritical toward the events on the political scene. The manner in which these two documents were presented to the public was primarily through the conflict between these two factions, and it eliminated the possibility of mass participation and of the legitimacy that the declarations might have enjoyed had they been placed in a somewhat different context. If I had to choose between the two, I would opt for the May Declaration.

#### The Committee Cuts Across Party Lines

[MLADOST] The background of the Committee may be described as a conflict between two principles, sovereignty and democracy. The question is, from which of the two is the alternative policy to be derived, from sovereignty or from democracy? Did the Committee not become a victim of national sovereignty and its iconography? That is to say, has it not abandoned the universalism to which its own name commits it, defense of human rights and freedoms?

[Bavcar] There was an ongoing conflict inside the Committee until the new alliances began to be formed. I myself and the majority of the Committee insisted that we did not want to be in opposition and that we did not want to assume the form of an opposition having goals other than the basic ones for which the Committee was organized, that is, protection of human rights.

[MLADOST] But despite this fact you participate in day-to-day politics. And so, for example, you signed the joint statement of all opposition alliances on the kind of elections you want.

[Bavcar] Yes, but we also stated clearly why we did this. Because Article 22 on human rights speaks of the right to elections, this is one of the modern standards without which human rights are out of the question. The only thing we advocate is establishment of democratic procedures. After all, in the 4th article of our bylaws we stated that we would fight for the implementation of laws and for a constitution that would respect human rights. It was for just this reason that we signed this statement about the kind of elections we want, and if you have read

this document carefully you will have noted that it deals exclusively with the formal conditions that must be satisfied in order to be able to speak of fair and honest elections. The Committee does not want to run in the elections and has no political aims other than protection of human rights. On the other hand, this is the only possible position, because to some extent the Committee cuts across party lines. This is self-evident, inasmuch as human rights are something outside any party particularism.

[MLADOST] The position of the Committee of which you are chairman can be approached from another angle. Although it terms itself "Committee for Protection of Human Rights," it operates exclusively as a Committee to defend Jansa and others. Is this not yet another lapse into what we may term pseudospecificity?

[Bavcar] In our work we have decided to dedicate ourselves to the general questions which we are setting in motion in connection with the case of the Ljubljana Four. And so we have broached the subject of the constitution, and after it the subject of the elections. In the future we will take up the question of political prisoners, police powers, the rights of a person under investigation, the way in which a sentence is served, and so forth. But we have left all specific cases to the Bavcon group, which is working on them.

[MLADOST] The background of the "Ljubljana Trial" remains unclear to this day. What point has been reached in the investigations into its background?

[Bavcar] As we know, the background of the trial has not yet been made clear. We worked on analyzing the trial and its causes until a special commission was appointed in the Slovene Assembly. It was highly essential to us to have an official government body work to analyze the trial background rather than the Committee for Protection of Human Rights, because we believe that if we were to do the analysis, we would reach a state of no longer being able to speak of a legal government, in that one group of citizens would be engaged in investigation of a case which intrudes both into government order and into the integrity of the persons who have intervened in this entire case. The Committee's decision not to concern itself with the investigation into the background of the trial arose from the conviction that a commission of the Assembly of Slovenia is the legitimate body for such an investigation. Although the belief still exists that this commission will be able and willing to arrive at the truth about the trial, much has happened lately indicating that it will be very difficult to discover the real background of the trial and that it will be very difficult for the commission to complete its investigation. First of all, the government, primarily the Presidency of Slovenia, has displayed several prejudices. The Presidency has stated on several occasions that, on the basis of its findings, there is no justifiable doubt that the trial was politically motivated. Moreover, suddenly the parliamentary Commission began to work more slowly, and persons who should answer its questions are not responding. This

applies above all to Slovene politicians, to Stanovnik, Ertl, who is the minister of police, and his associates, to Andrej Marinc, who at the time was chairman of the Committee for Protection of Constitutional Order, and Kucan, who after the second report suddenly became one of the figures involved in the background of the trial, because the findings of the second Commission report made it clear that the police also reported to him about its secret investigation into the "Mikro-Ada." Consequently, the Committee presents its position on all these questions in its latest news release. If the Commission does not continue its work, and it may be assumed that something such as this may happen, only then will we present our view of this entire trial.

#### Dedicated Lawyers

[MLADOST] Can you give us an outline of this view now?

[Bavcar] No. The thing is that in a way we gave a mandate to this Commission and in a manner of speaking we are collaborating with it, in the sense that we comment on its findings and direct questions to the Commission about what still remains to be done. For the time being, however, we are strictly refraining from giving a definitive picture of this entire trial. We believe that this game should be played out to the end, or at least until it becomes clear that the Commission will no longer be able to continue its work and present a correct and complete picture of this trial. Hence we do not want to be hasty and present contrived findings; doing so might impair the legitimacy of the Commission. This is something we do not want, and on the other hand, just this might cause the Commission's work to be blocked, something we also do not want. Insofar as I personally am concerned, I fully agree with the viewpoint presented by Jansa in the latest issue of MLADINA. It is interesting to note that this article could be published only in MLADINA and in no other Slovene print medium, even though all our bulletins have been in demand in the Slovene media.

[MLADOST] In addition to its legal aspect, this trial has its political meaning. What do you consider it to be? What are its political substance and its result?

[Bavcar] First of all, the meaning both of the trial and of the Committee is to be sought precisely in the fact that it opened up certain questions and induced people on a large scale to concern themselves with questions which had been there over the past seven to eight years but could not be infused with a new quality. That is to say, personal involvement appeared as a new phenomenon in Slovenia, because previous political sophistication had not been characterized by expression of political and other positions in this manner. I have in mind above all the public groups, the fantastic animation and intensive participation by all strata of the population in this entire movement that has now been created. This case has had so many different meanings to different persons, but it has also had certain common points at which all this

variety has been concentrated. This is the meaning of law and a legal government, which I am convinced became fully legitimate in Slovenia only with this trial. The other meaning is to be found in what is termed national consciousness. Thirdly, there is a kind of democratic dimension to this entire movement, and lastly there is the involvement of the professional public, of the legal profession. In connection with this last point I can say that the Committee would mean nothing had it not been for the assistance of the legal profession. Only to a certain extent have we been carried along by these major actions. And what is the most fascinating thing for Slovenia, whose people are known to want to be different at any cost, even when they are not, is that all this multitude of political approaches, factions, and currents has merged in the Committee and has acted on the question of human rights as a harmonious group. This trial and what happened as a result of the action by the Committee have created a sort of truce among all the active political forces in Slovenia. Thus it seemed to us at one moment that there were no conflicts whatever between the government and society, that we were all the same. Today we see that it was only one moment.

[MLADOST] Does this mean that you have not been enthralled by the role of the national tribune?

[Bavcar] No, never. Not even when we were carried away by this homogenization, which at one time was truly fascinating and could have turned anyone's head. After all, the staff of the Committee, of which I am chairman, is made up of 40 persons of different political orientations; it is impossible for such a committee to have a narrow political profile because it embodies so many different currents. There is the Bishop's Conference. Its chairman, Anton Stres, is a staff member; then there is Sreco Kirn, who is a candidate member of the Yugoslav League of Communists Central Committee, and Zizak, who is close to the League of Communists. But there are also "anticommunists"—Spomenka Hribar and France Bucar. All in all, it would be absolutely foolish for any of these persons to try to create a politically slanted team. It is impossible. And we have always worked on the basis of insisting on the general dimensions relating to human rights, despite our ideological convictions.

We have now reached the point where our insistence on clarification of the background of the trial is something that will lead us into conflict with one part of public opinion. This latest information made public by Jansa just today makes it clear that the liberal wing of the party intervened in the trial, and it is well known that this wing is very popular with the Slovene public. I know that because of this we will come into conflict not only with the sides which prepared this trial but also with one part of the Slovene political scene and with one segment of the public.

### Independent Writers Set Program in Sarajevo

90EB0180A Zagreb *DANAS* in Serbo-Croatian  
26 Dec 89 pp 35-36

[Article by Vlastimir Mijovic: "Manuscript of Yugoslav Tolerance"]

[Text] You should never put all your eggs in one basket. But insofar as their public commitment is concerned, in a way Yugoslav writers have in recent years become accustomed to quarrels, capricious messages, political skirmishes, ultimatums, and on the whole very difficult words with which they have tried to settle their own disputes, original or imposed. Writers have almost become a synonym for the general Yugoslav chaos, especially at the cultural level. For who knows how many times, the forthcoming annual meeting of the Yugoslav Writers' Union will not redeem representatives of all the republican or regional associations. The first to announce their abstention were members of the Croatian Writers' Society, but, on the principle of breaking bread together, which operates faultlessly among writers, it will probably not stop with them. It is also certain that missing from the 1990 Yugoslav writers' summit will be a large group of 30 writers who recently took an oath in Sarajevo, while promoting the so-called Independent Writers, to be clearly at variance with the actions of the current Yugoslav Writers' Union.

And no matter how much the Independent Writers have stressed in their program principles the general social dimension of their own protest—a sort of intellectual conscientious objection—to a great extent their gesture is a reaction to events in their own guild. Against all this, the "independents" in Sarajevo have raised their voices, and all this is current today, and markedly so, especially among their colleagues.

Intolerance, quasi-democracy, ideological frustration, ambition, cronyism, and ethnic, religious, and political exclusivity. The revolt of the Independent Writers group really is primarily a revolt against the much larger and socially more powerful group of "dependent litterateurs." Their commitment, of course, is a function of "defense against the threats of a sick society" (this was the theme on which the initial meeting was held), but is also a function of defense on the part of one profession which admittedly is not characterized merely by fine speech and humane thought; however, through history we have not become accustomed to having the opposite be dominant in this group either. Writers as "wonders of the world" have in Yugoslavia indeed become unique proclaimers, as well as glorifiers, of dissension and personality at any cost. Are the "independents" in this context a slender reed for salvation both of one profession and of society as a whole from even greater chaos? The scope of their rescue operation has been possibly best characterized by Vidosav Stevanovic. She is the one of the four (along with Mirko Kovac, Filip David, and Zivojin Pavlovic) who initiated formation of the so-called Independent Writers.

"I think that writers really cannot do anything special. We are all aware of the limitations of any human activity, and especially writing activity, which nevertheless remains above all in the domain of speech, that is, in the domain of the cultural and moral. However, I submit that our strength will lie in our weakness, and our advantage in our sensitivity to the injustices that are being done. I think that this really is the only thing we can do," says Stevanovic.

### Defense of Freedoms

So what are the injustices to which the "Independents" are especially sensitive?

The Independent Writers as a free and informal group of writers based on intellectual affinities, as they are termed in the title of the "Fundamental Principles, Goals, Actions, and Association of the Independent Writers," are particularly sensitive to any form of partisan, ethnic, ideological, and religious dissension. In this connection the Independent Writers reject *a priori* any pragmatic political and powerholding ambitions. They define joining their association as a suprapolitical gesture of conscience and responsibility, a kind of public rejection of "participation in ethnic squabbles, struggle for power, and restalinization of society." However, this is expected of other, more pragmatic political associations. In their opinion the disastrous consequences of the absence of opposition are apparent in our country, and any society with no intellectual or political opposition is a "sick society."

High on the agenda of the Independent Writers are defense of artistic freedoms and human rights, the right to think differently, the possibility of public dialogue, and tolerance of all political, religious, and ethnic differences. Hence it is a programmatic obligation of all persons who join the Independent Writers to prove themselves by public commitment to be defenders of a lawful state with recognized civic and artistic freedoms.

As one of their basic documents the Independent Writers in Sarajevo also have adopted one entitled "On Rights and Freedoms" (along with the "Principles of the Independent Artists' Union," which they have pledged to form, and a report on the "European Cultural Club"). In this basic document, human rights and artistic freedom are treated as complementary concepts.

"Full human rights are not possible without artistic freedom, and artistic freedom is pointless and immoral without full human rights. Violation of human rights is also a reduction of artistic freedom, just as suppression of artistic freedom is of course a violation of human rights." So states this document signed by the first 30 members of the Independent Writers (of the founding group of 30, only Abdulah Sidran was not present, but he has confirmed his membership). This principle is given concrete expression in nine points, in the form of support by the Independent Writers for the following:

1. Elimination of any form of ideological, party, or police control of art and artists.
2. Destruction of all secret police files on artists and prevention by law of the creation of such files in the future.
3. Elimination of publishing and program councils in publishing houses and all mass media, along with all the personnel coordinating bodies related to them.
4. Elimination of all blacklists and of all criteria determining suitability from the viewpoint of political morality.
5. Permission for artists to defend their rights and protect their material interests through an independent trade union of their own.
6. Legal permission for restoration of the valuable institution of artistic patronage, bequests, and free foundations.
7. A unified law which would be in harmony with the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki documents and would guarantee minimum artistic freedoms and human rights throughout Yugoslavia.
8. Obligation of the state to finance artistic activities of all kinds out of the state budget, in proportion to the actual extent of such activities.
9. Participation by the private sector on an equal footing in all types of art, along with the establishment of legal private publishing enterprises, distributors, art galleries, newspapers, periodicals, theaters, and radio and television stations.

The Independent Writers have confirmed the informality of their assembly by their extremely liberal and flexible organizational structure. In addition to the fact that the "Independents" will have no permanent and fixed headquarters, they will not have a traditional president. Three coordinators have been selected in Sarajevo, Velimir Viskovic, Ivan Lovrenovic, and Aleksandar Tisma.

Their association will operate through four basic means: periodic meetings, their own publishing activities, the Independent Intellectuals' Forum, and an initiative to form independent artists' unions. As for financing, they will rely on donors, various foundations, and earnings from publishing ventures; if necessary, voluntary donations would be solicited from citizens. A carefully worked out set of rather severe procedures is accordingly being accepted among the Independent Writers. Persons become members when invited, when sponsored by at least two full-fledged members, or on the basis of a majority decision by the Independent Writers' Meeting.

Every member is granted full freedom of literary, public, and political action, but the possibility is also provided of expulsion if individuals in exercising their freedom violate the basic programmatic principles and aims of

the Independent Writers. A majority vote of the meeting is then required for expulsion.

### **Ideological Obstructions**

At the founding meeting in Sarajevo, the Independent Writers devoted the greatest care in drawing up the program documents to definition of the so-called Yugoslav cultural area. The draft documents stressed that "the Independent Writers will use the word 'Yugoslavia' exclusively as a geographic concept," and that wording defining the "Yugoslav cultural area" would be adopted after discussion. Mirko Kovac believes that this is the better wording, while Ivan Lovrenovic holds that any politicization and ideologization should be avoided in this context as well.

"We conceive of Yugoslavia as one spiritual, physical, and above all, cultural and communications area within which we accept, respect, and honor to the maximum the existence of all ethnic cultural entities and characteristics; we promote their natural communication rather than communication at the level of artificial political and ideological obstructions that have led to these complications we are experiencing today," states Lovrenovic.

The Independent Writers of Yugoslavia took its first important step by submitting an application for membership in the so-called European Cultural Club, which was inspired by a small group of prominent independent writers in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR. And the Yugoslav cultural area will not become fully meaningful until the European cultural area has been unified and the distinctive features of individual ethnic cultures are fully respected.

In its first public communication, which was originally to have been a full-fledged basic program document, the Independent Writers define Europe as a "common home for individual and tolerant ethnic cultures." In this connection an effort is being made in Yugoslavia to promote the fundamental assumptions of the European Cultural Club. Hence a new atmosphere must be created for different kinds of artists' associations; the artificial

obstacles dividing Europe must be removed and a unified European cultural area promoted; artists must be encouraged to come out of the isolation that had been imposed on them; ways should be found for them to hold more frequent creative encounters; artists should be protected from bureaucratic, political, and commercial manipulation; and all forms of nationalism must be opposed. The Independent Writers of Yugoslavia stress the similarity of their views with those of the initiators of the idea of a European cultural club headquartered in Prague; among the first to subscribe to the idea were Vaclav Havel, Ivan Hofman, Arnost Goldflam, Andrej Bitov, and others.

The Independent Writers have formulated and set major goals for themselves. It would, of course, be illusory to expect everything to proceed like clockwork, for wishes to come true right away. But in any event it is an encouraging fact that the general decline is not yet in full swing, that here and there similar voices are speaking out and similar views are being expressed.

And the founders of the Independent Writers in Sarajevo themselves have stressed as a major step the fact that they have met and organized, that serious matters have been discussed intelligently and with tolerance, that is, in a manner not typical of their official professional organization, the Federation of Writers of Yugoslavia. And this in itself is a starting point, and not just in the arrangement alone. Close cooperation has been scheduled with similar associations in other areas and with creative artists and intellectuals of different professional orientations. What we are witnessing, then, is the genesis of a similar independent spirit in different places. The Association is trying to make things somewhat easier in this country with fresh, humane, and democratic ideas and by action in accordance with those ideas and with its conscience.

It is a good thing that writers did not remain at the tail end of such events, as was logical, and that they were not the first to have advanced similar ideas. It is really not important who thought of it first. What is important is to have its impact felt as soon as possible in the daily life of society in this country.

## POLAND

### Defense Industry Conversion 'Panacea': Not Quite So

90EP0319B Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI  
in Polish 21 Jan 90 p 8

[Article by Stanislaw Reperowicz: "Defense Industry Without Secrets"]

[Text] Until recently, industrial enterprises producing anything for the armed forces were shrouded in secrecy. This lack of openness made the impression that we are a country which produces tremendous amounts of military hardware and armaments. This was particularly apparent in periods of mounting economic crises and shortages of goods in the market. In search of ways to cure the economy, the thesis was advanced at the time—mainly by people who were not knowledgeable—that converting the production of armaments to civilian uses is the only or the main panacea for all the difficulties we are facing. However, reality turned out to be more complicated.

After all, several dozen large and small enterprises belonging to different industries which produce goods for the needs of the army and have the status of "the defense industry enterprise" constitute the backbone of the Polish defense industry. Important as the task of producing materiel, armament, and materials necessary for the purposes of defense is for all of them, all of them are involved in producing goods for the market, naturally, to varying degrees. We do not have enterprises working exclusively for the armed forces. This is our old Polish tradition which dates back to the interwar period, and which was reborn after the year 1945 in the course of expanding the defense industry. For example, a factory producing aluminum utensils has this status, strange as it may be, because one of its shops produces something for the army. One more point: A majority of these enterprises report not to the minister of national defense but rather to their own economic departments, presently [being] the minister of industry.

Since the end of the 1950's, we have seen increasing participation by this industry in supplying our shops. This is particularly apparent at present, a period of restructuring in the army and consistent decline in orders by the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense. The goods turned out by these enterprises are of high quality and high technology because the enterprises are new. By way of an example, I will mention that, among others, they include the 26-inch color TV set Neptune 705 and a new type of a video cassette recorder. Certainly, every housewife would like to have in her kitchen toasters, juicers, and grinders (including those for nuts), as well as an egg boiler produced by the Metal Working Enterprise in Skarzysko which has the status of a "defense industry enterprise."

We should also add that, despite the opinions of some people, the defense industry does not use budgetary

subsidies from the state; it is a self-financing industry. In principle, it operates on the basis of Polish scientific and technological developments, and uses licenses only to a small degree. This is a very good industry, organized in an exemplary manner and disciplined, which has skilled cadres of engineers and technicians and conscientious employees. Its performance is good despite the fact that it has to overcome difficulties just as other enterprises do.

On the other hand, 19 enterprises called the WPRP [Military Repair and Production Enterprise] report to the minister of national defense. Altogether they employ about 17,000 people, or as many as a large factory, iron mill, or mine. Several of them have been adapted for repairs of aircraft. Several other enterprises repair motor vehicles, i.e., tanks, armored personnel carriers, cars, and so on. The remaining enterprises repair armament, electronic and communications equipment, military engineer materiel, and so on. A Navy Shipyard serves the needs of this arm of the armed forces.

Therefore, these are first of all repair enterprises, called upon to maintain the condition of military materiel. Their production operations include, in principle, only the objects, mainly spare parts, which cannot be procured from general industries on time or in adequate quantities. After all, in Poland we are also familiar with the "gasket" problem! This is also anti-import production which saves currency.

These enterprises, likewise, traditionally work to meet civilian needs. For example, in 1989 military orders took up as little as 60 percent of their production capacity. It should be noted that these orders are continuing to decline considerably.

### Within the Framework of Civilian Services

In 1989, the WPRP repaired 150 delivery motor vehicles for the national economy, including 70 for agriculture, almost 500 trucks (150 for agriculture), 2,000 car engines (500 for agriculture), 900 diesel engines (mainly for mines and the Polish State Railways), 105 bulldozers, snow graders, power saws, and over 200 aircraft engines for planes used in communications and agriculture.

Contracts were also carried out for producing 30,000 shock absorbers for trailers and agricultural implements, 14,000 bagging machines for grain separators, 120 tree uprooting machines, and 350 1.5-ton trailers. Six hundred and fifty locks for safes, 9,000 regulators for bus heating systems, 5,800 thermostats, 12,000 inductors for telephones, 1,200 containers, 100 radar screens, and 200 shock absorbers for cars were delivered to the market, as well as tens of thousands of other kinds of sought-after goods, such as reservoirs for waste water treatment, fuel tanks, spare parts for combined harvesters, deep-shovel excavators, fire fighting equipment, concrete mixers, strawberry harvesting machines, cherry-tree-shaking machines, and so on. All of this was done by 19 small enterprises as a sideline, along with military production.



### Let Us Look at One of Them

Military Motor Vehicle Enterprise No. 3 in Glowno is one of the larger enterprises among the 19. The factory is old, it has existed for more than 100 years now. For decades, it has been restoring the technical efficiency and improving the operational characteristics of various types of armored personnel carriers. Trucks used in the armed forces have also been repaired here.

Along with this, work has always been done for the market to some degree. Traditionally, tools sought by all motorists have been primarily produced here, such as flat and curved box wrenches of all sizes, grease compressors, 5-ton gear and hydraulic jacks. Parts for cars have also been produced, for example, hydraulic shock absorbers for the Star-type vehicles.

Changes under way in the armed forces in recent years caused considerable reductions in military orders at Glowno. Along with the decline, the number of employees dropped from 2,200 to 1,400 in the second half of 1989. On the other hand, the production of "civilian" goods increased to 28 percent of total output.

General Director Colonel Engineer Jerzy Niziolek believes that right now they could direct one-half of output to consumers other than the armed forces if they had respective orders. After all, they operate entirely on their own account. Therefore, the volume of production directly affects the level of earnings.

They want to retain the prestige of their enterprise. The WZM-3 is the largest enterprise in this city of 17,000.

Work at the enterprise is a family tradition for a considerable segment of the work force.

### This Is Where Their Fathers and Grandfathers Worked

The enterprise House of Culture is the focus of cultural and educational activities in the area. They have their own hotel and a cinema for the general public which the city does not have. In addition, they have a four-group day-care center, a good athletic club, recreation centers, gardening lots, and the only professional firefighters in the area. Five hundred and ten families live in the two residential developments which the factory has built...

Chief Engineer Colonel Włodzimierz Dabkiewicz believes that they may accept more orders for vehicle repairs than thus far from civilians, particularly farmers. If, for example, somebody's Bizon [combined harvester] breaks down, they can repair it well in Glowno because they have modern diagnostic equipment and skilled professionals. They also have rare pieces of technical equipment which make it possible to accomplish very complex tasks, such as grinding engine crankshafts, checking out injection pumps after repairs, and so on.

They take into account the need to increase the production of new goods. At present, they are filling a valuable order from the FRG for producing 120,000 metal cassettes shaped like small suitcases... and they keep looking tirelessly for orders and work.

Difficulties? The same as in our entire industry—mainly shortages of raw materials and high prices for materials jacked up by monopolistic suppliers. These, however, are different issues.

## INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

### CEMA Member's Participation in Joint Ventures Cited

90EG0177A East Berlin AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT  
in German No 5, 31 Jan 90 pp 6-7

[Unattributed article: "Joint Venture: Discriminating Form of Cooperation for Selected Plans"]

[Text] A joint venture (literal translation: common hazard, risk; in technical terminology also: partnership or mixed enterprise) involves a complicated and discriminating plan. A typical characteristic feature is the association of at least two partners previously independent of one another on a national or usually international level in a joint enterprise. This, then, results in a contractually established enterprise legally autonomous from the founding fiduciaries conceived for an extended period of time or permanently—usually in the form of a private corporation or a stock corporation. The partners contribute assets or liquid capital, know how, marketing systems and so on with the goal of a joint activity in the areas of research and development, production, marketing, or furnishing services.

Pertinent legal requirements regarding shares to be contributed (e.g., 51:49 percent) as well as stipulations for tax reduction and transfers of profit are necessary from the State's perspective.

Management positions as well as profits and losses for the partners in such enterprises result from the contributed shares.

### Increasing Competitiveness as a Goal

Although this form of cooperation has become a focal point in recent years, primarily in East-West economic relations, its origin lies in the Capitalist world economy. Research by the UNO Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) indicates that the formation of joint ventures increased, predominately in the 1970's. In the 1980's, an average of more than 200 joint ventures originated in the United States, and an average of more than 400-500 joint ventures originated in the EC area.

The motivation for joint ventures ensues from profit-oriented and strategic considerations of concern management. They see in this form of cooperation a possibility of surmounting the immensely increased expenditures for conquering scientific and technical progress with a relatively advantageous capital outlay. At the same time, the increased trend toward global trade is supposed to be met in this manner. The partner's special experience and potential (e.g., technology, patents, and marketing systems) are supposed to be utilized and increase competitiveness. It was no coincidence that distinguished concerns from the United States, Japan, and the EC formed joint ventures in high technology areas in recent years. This applies, e.g., to semiconductors, lasers, telecommunications, robots, technical

ceramics, biotechnology, and environmental protection equipment on the product side. Participating firms, among others, were ITT, IBM, Honeywell, and General Electric from the United States; Mitsui, Toshiba, Toyota, and Hitachi from Japan, and VOEST, Philips, Ciba-Geigy, Fiat, ENI, ICI, Siemens, and Degussa from Europe.

Some selected examples illustrate mutual interests:

- The Japanese construction equipment concern Komatsu entered a joint venture agreement with Dresser, the major American producer of construction and mining technology. The new enterprise moves up to second place among capitalist construction machinery manufacturers behind Caterpillar, the American enterprise.
- Seven major Japanese shipbuilders, including Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Kawasaki, reached an agreement to form a joint venture for development of a diesel ship motor utilizing lightweight ceramic construction.
- After 12 months of negotiations, Siemens subsidiary Osram and the Japanese Mitsubishi Electric Corporation signed a contract to form a joint venture for mutual production and marketing of light sources. The announcement indicates that the Japanese partner will thus gain access to the most modern lighting technology in the world, and the West German concern acquires influence on the second largest international lighting market.

It is foreseeable that, taking the visible advantages as a basis, the formation of joint ventures among capitalist concerns will continue to be of great interest, since it is impossible for the concerns to maintain worldwide competitive postures in all branches on their own.

### Increasing Activity in East-West Economic Relationships

This form of cooperation has been exercised by Socialist countries for some years, as well. Among these, enterprises established in developing and in industrialized capitalist countries are focused on marketing. In mid-1989, European Socialist countries in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact with its partners there maintained approximately 500 Joint ventures with an investment volume of about \$800 million.

The first joint ventures in Socialist countries were formed in Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania, and China. Most notably in recent years, a marked expansion has taken place according to newest ECE [European Commodities Exchange] data. For example, 2,760 joint ventures with foreign capital interest were registered in CEMA countries and in Yugoslavia compared to 400 at the beginning of 1988, including about 1,000 enterprises in the Soviet Union, 670 in Yugoslavia, 600 in Hungary, 400 in Poland, 50 in Czechoslovakia, 35 in Bulgaria, and five in Romania.

According to ECE estimates, the total capital of registered foreign investments in the Soviet Union, Hungary,

Poland, and Czechoslovakia amounted to \$2.2 billion. Average foreign capital interest in factories is supposed to be between 41 and 45 percent.

Approximately 16,000 joint ventures existed in China in 1989.

However, it must be taken into consideration that, among the relatively high number of identified joint ventures, many never get past the registration stage. In addition, analyses demonstrate that these are often small enterprises whose clout in national economies is modest, especially since effectuated capital investments were low.

The creation of joint ventures is a lengthy and complicated procedure worldwide that can require several years from conception through completion. The phase of practical realization is only beginning for many of the joint ventures agreed upon in recent years.

The expectations of CEMA countries regarding additional stimuli and consequences for the intensification of their national economies by joint ventures have only been partially fulfilled so far. That is linked with the extent of foreign capital investments and the access to modern technologies, for example, and is revealed in an only modest increase of NSW exports, among others.

Estimates reveal that, with regard to area of activity, approximately half of the joint ventures originate in the industrial realm. The other half encompasses service areas with such focal points as banks, data processing, consulting, advertising and tourism. Among joint ventures in the industrial area, it is noteworthy that cooperation in such branches as engineering, vehicle manufacturing, electronics, consumer goods, chemistry, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology has already transpired. In the future, organizational consequences could ensue from this. Also, some major projects with significant capitalist enterprises that are supposed to be accomplished in the framework of joint ventures and that also carry national economic weight (taking the volume as a basis) were agreed upon by the Soviet Union in 1988 and 1989.

Most CEMA countries remain consistently interested in the formation of joint ventures. At the onset of the 1990's, a greater quantity of repercussions and experience will be available that will enable more precise evaluation of the role and posture of joint ventures in East-West economic relations. However, joint ventures will only be suitable for selected purposes in the future, also, considering that it concerns a complicated and highly developed form of cooperation that only has limited applications in the world economy.

[Box, p 6]

#### Criteria/Advice for the Formation of Joint Ventures

- Joint ventures are the most complicated form of cooperation. Therefore, in case of intent to cooperate it should be generally considered whether the conditions for formation of a joint venture are present in the respective collective, factory, or enterprise and whether other forms of cooperation bring about a quicker and more effective production and/or performance and market development.
- If a joint venture should prove to be the most suitable form of cooperation based on this test, then an intensive search for an optimum potential partner after a clear delineation of the realm of cooperation is recommended. If possible, scrutinize several interested parties from different countries in a genuinely competitive situation.
- The following criteria for seeking out a foreign partner, among others, should be included:
  - Experience from many years of economic or technical cooperation and/or from foreign relations.
  - National and international posture, financial strength, and stability of the enterprise.
  - Status, competitiveness, and innovative level of the products, technologies, and/or performance of the partner that represent the object and/or point of departure for the cooperation.
  - Possibilities of marketing jointly produced merchandise and/or performance rendered, including, among others, utilization of the partner's sales organization.
- Clarity regarding the following issues should be established in preparation for the decision:
  - Can a considerable production and effectiveness formation be achieved by the joint venture? Will significant capacity expansions ensue?
  - What short or medium term export increases into the NSW can be achieved? Are NSW import reductions possible?
  - What access to the most modern technologies results from the joint establishment? Are possible material and replacement part deliveries guaranteed?
  - What outlook develops for the financial situation of the joint enterprise? Is a good profit posture guaranteed?
  - What hazards from the partnership can result from a too one-sided dependency?

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Federal Vice Premier on Future of CEMA

#### Discussions at Recent Meeting Viewed

90EC0254A Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech  
12 Jan 90 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Vladimir Dlouhy, vice premier of the federal government, by Vladimir Matejovsky: "Czechoslovak Stiff Breeze in Sofia"; date and place not given]

[Text] The duel between Western and Czech journalists is reminiscent of a cat-and-mouse game though it is played on home territory. So we became a bit nervous when a self-confident American from the WALL STREET JOURNAL immediately followed us into the anteroom of Vice Premier Vladimir Dlouhy in the State Planning Commission's building in Prague. But fortunately the "order of reception" was kept.

To be perfectly honest about it, we had a certain advantage. The usual method of arranging interviews was turned around and so it was on the contrary MLADA FRONTA which was asked to see the Vice Premier! This happened because of our article yesterday, "Charge Forward, in the Direction of Reason!", about the just-concluded 45th CEMA meeting in Sofia in which, as V. Dlouhy put it, we were "the most aggressive" among all newspapers. Of course we are thankful for both the invitation and the bow.

We began the interview by touching upon the communique which we described yesterday as being without substance.

[Dlouhy] I am the CSSR's permanent representative in CEMA and so I have chosen you because I want to comment on the matter. That communique indeed amounted to a zero; we spent a long time wrangling about it. Originally it included a political passage, substantially outlining the political framework from which the change in CEMA ought to proceed. It dealt with fundamental changes in the East European economies, pluralist democracy, and the like. But some countries opposed it and since, unlike decisions, communiqués must be adopted unanimously, after long discussions the passage was crossed out.

[MLADA FRONTA] But, of course, unlike a communique, the decision is not made public. Can you then characterize it for us?

[Dlouhy] We went to Sofia with the unequivocal intention of rejecting the proposed program and decision. This we announced in writing to the CEMA secretariat on 4 January. The secretariat revised both, but we weren't too satisfied with the new version either. It was still handled as if the issue were a restructuring of the CEMA countries' multilateral cooperation. I would liken it to an effort to refurbish old tracks: polish them a little, give new paint and ties, and we'll chug along again...

[MLADA FRONTA] What was the position of the other CEMA members?

[Dlouhy] A number of them agreed that the CEMA statute is archaic. It still embodies the goals of building Communism, equalizing the economies of the individual countries, and so on. But the bone of contention was what we see as CEMA's purpose, or whether we need it at all. We say we need it for now but prefer bilateral to multilateral cooperation. The other delegations recognized that the remarks of our prime minister were the most progressive and went the farthest. In the past it was Hungary and Poland playing the role of radicals; now they were joined by Czechoslovakia which in many respects went farther. It is of interest that they did not support our demand to call an extraordinary CEMA session. We wanted it to take place before the end of June, so that work on a program of real changes can begin even now.

[MLADA FRONTA] Perhaps it does not bother them that much...

[Dlouhy] Of course it bothers them but they have elections. So the decision included our independent view that we do not want to wait until a regular session in the fall but rather want an extraordinary one before the end of June. In other words, we have taken the initiative. I arranged with the CEMA secretariat that they will request the individual countries to prepare by the middle of February their ideas on the necessary changes in CEMA. At the same time I am inviting representatives of all countries to meet in Prague in mid-March. We shall see.

[MLADA FRONTA] During the deliberations there was frequent speculation about a closer cooperation between us, Poland and Hungary...

[Dlouhy] This came rather from their side. I said already there that our side needs to give this matter sufficient thought.

[MLADA FRONTA] What was the attitude of other countries—say, for instance the GDR? Weren't they somewhere else in their thoughts?

[Dlouhy] To my surprise the GDR delegation hewed to relatively standard positions. More interesting was the approach of the non-European members—that is, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Cuba. Each of them used to play a certain role in the Soviet big-power policy. And they made the point that they had played a role in the past and now do not want to be cut out. We together with Hungary took a special stand on that in the decision. The others inclined to the view that in spite of ongoing changes the needs of these three countries will be given attention so as to equalize their economic level and so on. Let me note that the time allotted for preparing the decision was two hours; actually, it took five and a half. We demanded evidence that certain steps are being undertaken also by these three countries. Hence the difference in the communique. Our notion is that if we

are to support those countries they ought to take the same road as we, or else it will be difficult to harmonize assistance and it will not have beneficial effect for either side.

[MLADA FRONTA] This much from the part of the interview dealing with the just-concluded meeting in Sofia. Tomorrow we will report on the Vice Premier V. Dlouhy's views on CEMA's future development, our role and above all our relations with the USSR.

### Relations With USSR Characterized

90EC0254B Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech  
13 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with Vladimir Dlouhy, vice premier of the federal government, by Vladimir Matejovsky: "How to Trade With the USSR?"; date and place not given]

[Text] [MLADA FRONTA] So far we have dealt with the Sofia meeting. Of course there are other and different matters, such as dealings on the highest level, or the routine, daily commercial practice. In other words, how will we proceed in this respect vis-a-vis our CEMA partners, especially our most important trading partner, the USSR?

[Dlouhy] It is of essential importance that the Soviets have proposed a transition to world prices and free-currency clearing substantially as of 1 Jan 91. Even though, as noted in Premier Ryzhkov's presentation, they understand that this cannot happen immediately but rather over a period of three or possibly four years. This delay should allow for phasing in the impact of the transition which, in view of the structure of our trade with the USSR, may be quite painful to us.

I like to place this into a political framework. Prior to World War II we were one of the most developed countries. Certainly we cannot maintain that it was the unequivocal will of the Czechoslovak people to become incorporated into this political and economic bloc. I myself am not at all sure of that. We were maneuvered into an artificial dependence on a closed bloc which had to solve some matters in the way it did. Moreover it was subject to a totally ineffective system of planning and management and in spite of an absolute growth in living standards we have lost a great deal.

The political will was exercised primarily by the Soviet Union. Even though they are now reevaluating their past, this remains an incontrovertible fact. Hence the USSR together with us must bear the consequences of the transition to a market economy. Here I want to emphasize, and this is extremely important, that the transition to market does not mean only world prices and free currency. The Soviets cannot presume that they merely say, Yes, we are for the most radical reforms, for a market economy, for pluralist democracy and so on, and when you want market, let's go over to world prices and free currencies. This is by no means all! Indeed, international trade does not mean just trading at world

prices and paying in dollars. By the way, just determining what the world price is poses a problem. The market presupposes a number of systemic measures, first of all opening up the market. They cannot assume that we will go over to world prices and dollars and they will simultaneously block our access to their market. That is, that they will pick and choose which items they want to buy from us and the like. Our enterprises must have real access to the Soviet market.

[MLADA FRONTA] After all, the Soviet Union wants to have observer status with GATT (the international institution guarding freedom of trade; the CSSR is a member)...

[Dlouhy] Precisely. Of course the question is whether in free conditions our enterprises could find buyers in the Soviet market. But that already is something that impacts on us; the Soviets cannot resolve it for us. We are aware that we have a huge market beyond our eastern borders. Our only demand is that it be accessible to us while we agree with the need to go over to world prices and account balancing in free currencies. We only want to see it happen in phases. But I don't think of it in the sense of delaying the impact as much as possible. On the contrary, let our enterprise sphere be exposed as soon as possible to all impacts from the USSR side. But on the other hand, let our enterprise sphere have freedom of access to the Soviet market.

[MLADA FRONTA] What in your opinion is the phasing you mentioned?

[Dlouhy] This is of course the number one question. It depends on the balance sheet and primarily on direct bilateral negotiations with the USSR. These negotiations are still ahead of us. But I can say in general that phasing will be difficult from the USSR side when 80 percent of their exports consist of energy and raw materials.

[MLADA FRONTA] Are you considering also alternate import sources for these technological inputs?

[Dlouhy] No, we ought to think about the most favorable structure of our imports of raw materials and above all energy. Our present dependence in this commodity on the USSR is nearly absolute, which of course is not an optimum situation. We must recognize that the Soviet economy as well as the entire society is undergoing major changes characterized by a certain degree of uncertainty.

[MLADA FRONTA] I may be wrong, but I can hardly visualize a theoretical case when those dozens of million tons of crude oil the USSR is exporting to Eastern Europe are suddenly thrown on the world market, without it causing a dramatic impact...

[Dlouhy] Of course. Maybe in terms of volume to us it could be done, but in the total it seems hardly doable.

[MLADA FRONTA] Back to CEMA. You mentioned our intention to move from the multilateral to the bilateral, indicating a move away from the CEMA umbrella?

[Dlouhy] Yes, in the long term there is a large question mark hanging over CEMA. Its ten member economies differ in their levels of development, they are now taking different approaches to systemic changes, they have different political foundations. Let us recognize that, to give an example, West European integration was born with a good deal of pain. And it brought together countries advanced relatively equally, with compatible economic principles and pluralist democracy. But of course CEMA cannot be abolished immediately, as some journalists put into the mouth of Minister Klaus. Because it still has a number of functions which cannot be disregarded. But I want to emphasize two things. In the long term there is a large question mark over CEMA, and in the short term there should be no hesitation to introduce changes. Its method of operation until now has been extremely cumbersome, and even now in Sofia there were voices substantially defending it.

[MLADA FRONTA] Then how do you visualize the priority order for radical changes?

[Dlouhy] Unquestionably in the area of finances. In other words, exchange rates, world prices, and account balancing in free currencies.

[MLADA FRONTA] And what about trading conditions. By that I mean legal guarantees and reciprocal opening of markets.

[Dlouhy] That too is of course very important and we must work on it concurrently. It is just not possible first to change one thing and later another.

[MLADA FRONTA] The last question will be specific, about the fate of integrated construction projects in the USSR?

[Dlouhy] I don't want to alarm the people working there. But all the same I must point out that these are economically dubious undertakings. You yourselves have brought out that we spent there 30 korunas to make one ruble, and sometimes even more. This we must take into account.

## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

### Trade Minister's Views on Joint Ventures Cited

90EG0164A Duesseldorf *HANDELSBLATT* in German  
5 Feb 90 p 8

[Article by Heinz Boschek: "Joint Ventures Are Going To Be an Item Definitely Planned for in Domestic Trade, Too"]

[Text] East Berlin, 3-4 Feb—A centralistic economy by fiat, coupled with an undemocratic political administrative regime, can produce nothing but societal distortions. That was the major lesson he learned from the past years, declared GDR minister for trade and supply, Manfred Flegel, in a talk with *HANDELSBLATT*.

In his opinion, the mistakes of a Stalinist planned economy showed up most clearly in the construction system. Success and failure had always been measured by the increase in housing units alone. This quantitative thinking resulted in construction firms preferring to build in wide-open spaces, while entire city areas had fallen into wreck and ruin. Leipzig and Weimar are frightening examples for him, stated the politician, delegated to the government by the NDPD [National Democratic Party of Germany].

### Important for Political-Psychological Consolidation

People had been helplessly subjected to that. They had had no room to develop their capabilities economically and to emancipate themselves politically. This also holds true for the trade and supply sector. Minister Flegel emphasized that his intent was to bring about fundamental changes here.

The immense importance of trade and supply for the overall economy are expressed in a few figures cited by the minister: The GDR's trade network comprises some 76,000 sales outlets, among them 29 department stores, 1,500 smaller department stores, 225 rural shopping centers, more than 26,000 restaurants of all forms of ownership as well as 800 hotels, including 33 Interhotels. Approximately 600,000 people are employed in this economic sector.

The various promotion measures by the GDR Government made the number of private retailers and restaurateurs grow to 27,462. Their contribution to improving the GDR's supply situation with an 8.5-percent share in total sales of the retail trade must not be underestimated. Compared to the previous year, total retail sales in 1989 rose by 3.5 percent. In the past year, compared to 1988, additional consumer goods in the amount of M 4.4 billion were sold across the counter. The lion's share was earned by industrial goods, whose turnover rose by 6.1 percent, while food and semiluxury goods rose by only 0.7 percent. One-third of the latter goods alone were sold in small department stores.

From all this one must conclude, said minister Flegel, that trade is of great importance for a political-psychological consolidation of the GDR.

### Arbitrary Rule by Authorities To Be Eliminated in Future

If trade did not function, surely even more people would leave the country. True, his sphere of authority would be politically overloaded if he were given sole responsibility for ending the emigration wave. But naturally, supply plays an important role when it comes to contentment of the citizens. In this regard he is not without hope, however, said Minister Flegel.

He does not see very great problems, at least for the first half of the year. Goods in the amount of M 4.4 billion are

secured, which corresponds approximately to the estimated needs of the population. Of course, gaps in the goods basket cannot be overlooked.

The NDPD politician energetically rejected opinions that GDR citizens were leaving their country because of the "fuller plates in the FRG." This is certainly an underestimation of the GDR citizen who has come of age. The reasons for leaving are varied, not to be reduced to just food and drink. Often the West looks for an easy explanation. One must jointly examine the causes and jointly provide redress.

Under his management, the ministry for trade and supply has increased its efforts to exert a positive influence on the settled state of GDR citizens through reforms. At the center stands promotion of private trade. Minister Flegel pointed to the longstanding tradition of private trade in Germany, even later on in the GDR. In contrast to other East bloc states, it has always permitted private trade. Manfred Flegel declared he was convinced that no one in today's GDR could seriously relinquish the breadth of the private trade network and the expert knowledge of retailers.

As an example, he cited pharmacists, who are practically a supply-policy imperative in the GDR. The policy of the ministry of trade and supply aims at promoting private enterprises through improved structural conditions. This is proved by a number of decisions and declarations of intent.

New chambers of commerce and trade are to be created with a new content of tasks and statutes. They are to be elected from below in order to eliminate arbitrary decisions by authorities in the future. The tax-exempt amount for married couples will be raised from 2,000 to 4,000 marks. Standard wages in private trade, including restaurant personnel, will be increased by an average of 150 marks per month, thus putting them on the same level with basic wages in the so-called state-owned retail trade. Business people can pay their employees up to 500 marks annually as bonuses. The present regulation that a sum amounting to 2.5 percent of gross wages continues to be available to private trade for bonus payments remains in force.

The minister admitted that only the planned big tax reform will provide better business conditions for private trade. The present tax rate of 90 percent for partnerships and 94 percent for corporations obviously doesn't entice anyone. He can foresee an approximate orientation along the lines of the FRG model, a tax rate of perhaps 60 percent.

As an important handicap for stable supply, particularly in the provinces, Minister Flegel mentioned the lack of transshipment and transportation capacities. The one-sided orientation of the former GDR leadership to rail transport had been a catastrophic error. The GDR rail network is probably the most fully utilized in Europe, but it also becomes more and more overburdened. At the same time there is a lack of trucks.

Up to now, he had also tried in vain for mobile trade for villages. As an example, Minister Flegel mentioned fish supply. He could neither erect expensive storage capacities in every village for that, nor guarantee mobile trade. These issues also cannot be solved in the foreseeable future.

Within the framework of existing possibilities, the ministry is trying to exert influence on producers so that fewer unsalable items are made. Certainly, in the last analysis one can only buy what is offered. But some things simply have to be done. Barely in office, he had prohibited forced purchasing. According to the customs of an economy by fiat, the trade could be forced to purchase unsalable goods from the producers.

Last year, the trade had rejected about 10 percent of the summer collection from the textile industry. The materials were qualitatively unacceptable. Better ones had to be imported, so that in December 1989 the trade ordered another seven percent. The remaining three percent are on the way to being contractually tied down.

In February, minister Flegel wants to assemble in an exhibit the unsalable items of the 1989/90 winter season and then arrive at conclusions together with producers, designers, and sellers. Inter-German competition is to enliven business in the future. One designer team each from the FRG and the GDR will be given the order to design the fall/winter collection 1990/91. Both teams are to have absolutely the same material preconditions. The better one will get the order.

As a joint task with the Ministry of Finance, Minister Flegel sees future price formation in the process of the necessary reduction of subsidies. New price determinations must be well prepared and their consequences observed precisely. Changes in demand, for example, are the very proper field for analysis by the Ministry for Trade and Supply. In his opinion, basic supply for the populace must be planned on a socially just basis. But higher prices are natural for special goods and services.

Hence it will not just be higher prices for flowers. Prices for vegetables must also be raised. Manfred Flegel said that he could imagine price reduction as the sole decision by his ministry. After all, it is better informed about supply and demand than the Ministry of Finance.

#### **For Close Cooperation With Western Firms**

Conclusions must be drawn very soon from the fact that only very few goods in the Exquisit and Delikat stores satisfy quality demands. These establishments actually do nothing but sell scarce goods. More will have to be done so that range of goods and prices are coupled.

Queried about the open intra-German border, the minister voiced his apprehension about Western buying propensity at favorable exchange rates. On the other hand, there are also positive aspects. The Leipzig market research institute has found that the chance for GDR citizens to shop in West Berlin and other FRG towns

near the border contributes to easing the GDR's burden. More precise data are not yet available, says the minister, but with regard to electroacoustical equipment it is becoming quite evident even without that. This merchandise is particularly expensive in the GDR, and particularly bad.

The NDPD politician emphatically endorsed close cooperation of the GDR trade with Western partners. He can picture joint ventures, without clinging to the 49-percent limit. The trade technology combine, which is in charge of furnishing the retail trade, is at the disposal of such cooperation. Minister Flegel cited his intention to establish an "Exquisit" business association with 250 enterprises and corresponding sales outlets. His wish: Since GDR cloth is mostly of poor quality and, for example, is much too heavy, an FRG supplier should be consolidated in a joint venture with the business association.

#### Long-Term Structural Policy Must Be Elaborated

With the change in the constitution on 12 January 1990, the GDR trade is also prepared for enterprises with foreign participation. In direct cooperative agreements between the GDR trade and FRG producers, the GDR could save the trading margin, and the producers would have a secure sales area for two to three years. But it is not intended to travel on a single inner-German track. At present, offers are being studied from Canada, Austria, Italy, France, and the USSR. In a joint venture with the USSR, for example, he is thinking of a joint speciality restaurant for freely convertible currencies in East Berlin. Among the groups targeted as consumers are the Western allies.

Asked whether a ministry for trade and supply was still needed in a developing market economy in the GDR, Minister Flegel replied that he is convinced of the necessity for such an institution, at least for the next few years. A socially oriented market requires guidance. A long-term structural policy must be developed. All this could not be done without his ministry. At the present time, the GDR citizen needs something like an advocate for supply questions. All enterprises want to export as much as possible. The ministry supervises so that domestic needs are not neglected.

The NDPD politician admitted that the GDR ministries are still a domain of the SED bureaucracy. It is no different in his ministry. But he does not want to make personnel changes right now because, as long as he does not yet have a new structure, he does not want to abolish the old one. He expects to have pushed through such structural changes within the next three months so that one can also discuss personnel consequences. Careers based on party membership cards will then be eliminated. Initial talks with New Forum had resulted in many interesting viewpoints. Minister Flegel declared that he would be open to any constructive cooperation in the future.

#### Private Enterprise Seminar Held in Gera

90EG0167A Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG  
in German 5 Feb 90 p 23

[Article by koe: "GDR Businessmen Are Set To Go; First Private Enterprise Seminar Well Received"]

[Text] Funds from the most recent ERP [European Recovery Program] Development Program, which is designed to assist small business in investing in the GDR, will be available as early as March. This is the optimistic prognosis made in the Thuringian city of Gera by Ruediger Schiller, a senior official of the German Equalization Bank [DAB] in Bonn-Bad Godesberg. However, at this first intra-German private enterprise seminar, sponsored by the Gera and Nuremberg Chambers of Industry and Commerce (IHK), Schiller warned the citizens of the GDR against unwarranted haste in their efforts to become independent. It has as yet not been clearly established how much of Bonn's DM6 billion fund approved for the 1990/93 period will be available for private business. Although the FRG Ministry of Economics has earmarked DM1.3 billion in credits, the total sum will depend on the demand for it, the DAB states. It hopes that an additional DM1 billion will be contributed by the Capital Assistance Program in 1991. The institute which administers the Ministry of Economics' development funds expects the free choice of banks in the GDR to be a reality in the near future. The current GDR central bank is likely to consist of both a state bank and a German commercial bank, according to Schiller. As in the FRG, businessmen in the GDR will deal with private banks and IHK's, he noted. There will be absolutely no discrimination in the allocation of funds—15-year maturity, five-year payoff period currently at 6.5 percent interest—Schiller reassured the seminar participants. Speciality restaurants will be accorded the same priority as hydraulic company revitalization. There will be no preferential treatment in the establishment of technology-based enterprises. Neither will there be regional quotas; in no way does the DAB want to give the appearance of patronizing anybody.

#### 560 Registrations

The seminar was more than fully booked. Only 50 of the 560 registrations could be accepted. Most participants came with very concrete ideas and plans to the place where the seminar was held, i.e., the House of Culture in Gera: a graduate engineer wants to open a travel agency; a software consultant wants to establish a basket weaving business; a technician would like to set up a physical fitness center. A production manager, expropriated in 1972, wants to return to private business. Almost all are in the same situation: They have many more ideas than money. However, they all willingly paid the fee of M 150 for the three-day seminar, in a sense as admission to the market economy. There was no euphoria, quite the contrary. Just like when each speaker emphasized that, in a strict sense, the basis for free enterprise is as yet nonexistent. Although it is possible to form a corporation, it will have to be done on the basis of a 1892 law.



How much minimum initial capital would there be required? "At least 20,000 Reichsmark," replied Gera lawyer Juergen Czernetzki, "and for that I don't have an exchange rate."

#### Joint-Venture Companies

Nevertheless, Czernetzki sees opportunities for budding entrepreneurs by way of the legal form of a corporation, although only as part of a joint venture. This is now permitted on the basis of the Regulation dated 25 January 1990 concerning the establishment and operation in the GDR of enterprises with foreign participation. The Regulation states that the startup capital—here in the amount of M 150,000—may be contributed in the form of tangible property. Such tangible assets include "both movable property and real estate, usufructuary rights, fixed and other property rights," according to paragraph 17 of the Regulation. The lawyer considers this part of the hastily enacted law a glimmer of hope. Because GDR citizens do not have the startup capital, and the GDR prohibits foreign investors from acquiring real estate, even though "quite a few FRG real estate brokers are already on the mat," says Czernetzki. Also, industrial areas continue to be subject to state management. However, the lawyer expects no FRG businessman to receive consideration. He believes investments in kind are a good solution although the issue of assessing the value of the assets is as yet unresolved. ("You can't use our prices for such calculations; every broker in the FRG would be laughing at me.")

#### Many Pitfalls

As it stands now, establishment of enterprises is subject to state approval. But in cases where an application was turned down, the state Contract Court's registration office merely reviews the procedures rather than the facts of the case. The lawyer explained that the Kreis Court is the competent body for hearing and rendering judgment in lawsuits concerning corporate law relations, "but, actually, such a chamber doesn't even exist." According to Czernetzki, another pitfall for business is the current tariff system. Even Kreis Council approval for an export does not necessarily mean that the customs authorities, in fact, permit the goods to leave the country. In his concluding remarks Czernetzki said, "I don't mean to discourage those who would like to establish new enterprises; I am just pointing out the facts."

#### Support of Pilot Project

The first intra-German private enterprise seminar, a pilot project sponsored by the Bavarian Economics Ministry, will be followed by four more this year. In response to the tremendous demand, the Nuremberg IHK is considering advanced and specialized events, e.g., on technology-oriented business management and seminars for trade representatives, designers, and restaurant owners. To promote continued cooperation, the Nuremberg IHK wants to sponsor the Gera Chamber. The

purpose, besides setting up a self-administering facility, is to transfer ways of promoting, e.g., the exchange of technology and recycling of waste materials. Basic and advanced training will also receive their effective support. Here, the Nuremberg IHK is considering calling on senior citizens and retired experts to provide basic and advanced training. However, the question of financing is still unresolved.

#### Critical Situation of Rail System Cited

*90EG0162A East Berlin SCHIENENFAHRZEUGE in German No 1, Jan 90 p 5*

[Article by Gottfried Koehler: "Critical Phase for Railroad"]

[Text] More than ever in recent weeks there has been public criticism of the quality and orderly operation of transportation involving the DR [GDR railroad].

Official assessments were given; they made the complexity of events and the accumulated tasks clear. With the renewal of socialist society the cards are on the table for all to see. The operating situation is not only complicated; today's requirements are no longer being met. The DR has entered a critical phase because of countless instances of neglect, especially wrong decisions by the government.

This state of affairs weighs heavily and is gnawing away, as is made clear by letters to us, even among SCHIENENFAHRZEUGE readers; given conditions as they are, their highly valued professional work will not alter the situation.

There are numerous reasons for this. The action which was taken in the 1970's to shift transport operations from the highway to the rail had a far-reaching impact, indeed it was decisive (the DR's growth in volume consequently increased by more than 50 percent in freight traffic and more than 30 percent in passenger traffic).

Thus, the DR exceeded by far the limits of its capacity, both from a material-technical point of view as well as in respect to personnel. Touted at the time as a "farsighted measure," the decision was clearly also a wrong decision.

Since then the DR's railroad network has been overloaded and, moreover, was and is in a poor state of repair. In addition, there was the extensive alkali damage to the concrete railroad ties and the resultant costly route renovations.

And in addition: a large percentage of vehicles and installations is obsolete and thus prone to breakdown; the technological processes were inadequately rationalized.

What will the situation be, what can it be under such conditions? What must be done on a priority basis in

order to achieve what Hans Modrow cited in the government's declaration: "Smooth management of transport tasks by railroad workers is decisive for the economy to function...."

The GDR's economy, as is also true of foreign customers, expects the DR to transport freight in a manner that meets demands and requirements. The DR has a transportation obligation which it must meet under all circumstances. Yet, and this is the first basic principle, the transport volume must be realistic. In all considerations and demands the measure of efficiency has to be the basis. The current situation will make it difficult to define this measure. And in this connection measures such as reducing the specific transport cost continue to apply. Ultimately they should be provable and effective.

It is possible that the announced change in energy policy involving a reduction in coal transport will contribute to easing the situation in freight traffic, this is also true of ceasing to concentrate construction activity in Berlin. The government's statement permits such conclusions.

As far as tourist traffic is concerned, the supply cannot be further expanded. This is the opinion of the DR's management.

In *SCHIENENFAHRZEUGE*, May 1989, we first pointed to the critical issues such as deficient cleanliness and services in excursion trains. In addition, there is the tendency not to stick to timetables—in spite of additional technological travel time in 1988. The supply of seats was scanty in the past few years, a fact which became particularly clear from the availability of relief trains for fair days or holidays. Since November there has been a system of special trains headed toward the FRG. In addition, a high level of demand has developed on these routes. An adequate supply of seats is not possible with the approximately 8,500 excursion train cars which can be put into use. New vehicles from the GDR's Halberstadt railroad repair yard will not reduce the missing capacity, especially since the DR's own production is limited and does not even make simple reproduction possible. In addition, the GDR railroad repair yards continue to be responsible for preventive maintenance for the rolling stock fleet, that is, for observing the operational parameters and for vehicle safety. As a result there is justification for the idea of linking the DR's efficiency with the tasks of building the GDR's rail vehicles. Even international tourist traffic is loaded with foreign currency! Hardly any other country has the great advantage of being able to depend on its domestic and at the same time so productive railroad vehicle industry when undertaking measures for stabilization. To date, then, whenever there were free capacities or other situations based on production or market, the DR received something! What is needed, even in respect to travel requirements in the 1990's, is an adequate material-technical basis, that is, an adequate and passenger-friendly supply of seats with the customary international service facilities.

In the past few months more than 3,500 railroad workers left their jobs to emigrate to the FRG. The DR's labor force situation is depressing, specifically because the large gaps are in key professions such as locomotive engineer, dispatcher, and track worker. To meet technological requirements there is a shortage of more than 2,500 locomotive engineers in tractive unit operation. Now more than ever before, it is a matter of making tractive unit use more productive, that is, of turning the working time of locomotive engineers into productive time. The numbers of trains and thus the requirements for tractive units must be reduced and the regular train network and the tractive forces must be better utilized. The operating fleet of tractive units was increased every year, however, the DR's specific capacity stagnated or it did not show a commensurate increase. It is high time to finally fulfill a basic requirement of the machine industry, to get management out of its vicious circle and to get organized in terms of efficient perspectives.

One further consideration. When dealing with the working conditions of the railroad workers, there are often unreasonable jobs. Repairs are frequently done out in the open, there is too much heavy physical work, there is an inadequate food supply for breaks. Targeted changes were "finished" with the argument of missing means or capacities.

According to management, an innovation in the balancing process is in sight. There is also an effort to achieve an increase in construction investment and in the repair capital for these purposes. There are prospects of soon being in a position to make decisions in the departments with sole responsibility about more means to improve working conditions.

Several thoughts on the situation as it emerged in the middle of November are set forth on this page of the January issue. Many deliberations will be necessary in the immediate future. Mainly in order to use the DR's own strengths to bring it back from the critical phase and make it a normally functioning operation.

### **1989 Crop Yields, Cultivation Factors Detailed**

*90EG0161A East Berlin FELDWIRTSCHAFT  
in German Jan 90 pp 3-5*

[Article by Prof. Dr. A. Winkel, Guelzow-Guestrow Institute for Plant Breeding, GDR Academy of Agricultural Sciences, and chairman, FELDWIRTSCHAFT editorial board: "Thoughts on the New Year"]

[Text] The year 1989 was characterized by profound socio-political changes that initiated a far-reaching rethinking process in agriculture as well. The voices calling attention to shortcomings and weaknesses became clearer. The assessment of what has been achieved became more objective and was in many cases sobering.

Our magazine too must become more of a mediator between science and practice. It should provide well-grounded expert knowledge, but also special know-how, in order to make it possible to lead today's production processes even more effectively. We would like to give the practitioner decisionmaking assistance and contribute to the refreshing of acquired knowledge while he is a student and during practical activity. Still, we would also like to provide more up-to-date information and promote the public exchange of different opinions. In this way, the personal responsibility of all authors for the publication of their results is further heightened.

The publication of scientifically based norms and standard values should support independent economization in every LPG [Agricultural Producer Cooperative] and every VEG [state farm], with due regard for applicable means of production and energy prices. We want to contribute more effectively to quick economic utilization of proven results in the interest of a greater rise in output in plant production, since the results of our agriculture play a critical role in the stability and dynamics of our national economy.

Several members of the editorial board have written on the 1989 harvest. The summary of their evaluations is provided for our readers' information.

### Soil Cultivation

An essential prerequisite for high yields is good soil cultivation. A. Kunze points out that the 1989 weather conditions placed high demands on soil cultivation collectives as well. Even in the spring tilling there was a major deficit in soil moisture, and water-saving cultivation was necessary.

The tillage quality was generally adequate, and full stands could be put to field. In the tillage for the second and catch crops, the drought was already having a clearly negative effect on capacity and the quality of soil cultivation, as well as on the emergence of the plants. Despite the drought, the expenditure for green manure and often the use for fodder as well proved worthwhile on a large part of the one million hectares of cultivated stubble.

Because of the dry weather, the precipitation grain could not be effectively combatted. The difficulties mentioned occurred to varying degrees locally in the cultivation of winter oil crops, winter catch crops, and winter grain. Because of inadequate availability of tractors and insufficient deliveries of plowshares and cultivators, the difficulties were even increased in some cases. Careful, low-cost processes for soil cultivation were applied to an inadequate extent, in part for subjective reasons, and in part for objective ones. Examples of this are combined ground soil cultivation, seed bed preparation and the sowing of catch crops, for which the preconditions are already in evidence at many enterprises, and the use of heavy cultivators instead of the plow for cultivating winter grain into root crops, which is limited by inadequate deliveries and by the lack of automatic overload controls on the prongs.

Because of severe soil hardening and the inadequate capacity of the plant production enterprises, the planned amount of topsoil loosening and partial topsoil deepening was not achieved.

For 1990, it can be concluded that in every enterprise with an objectively based planning and preparation system, the prerequisites for the extensive use of location- and crop-specific processes for protective soil cultivation must be created. This begins in the early spring with the diagnosis of more damaged areas or partial areas, the formulation of effective machinery combinations, and the outfitting of tractors with dual twin tires for the spring planting, humus deformation for potatoes in D [expansion unknown] locations, and row-based seed bed preparation for sugar beets and vegetables.

As far as the agricultural machinery industry is concerned, there is a need, in addition to adequate production of spare parts, for an increase in the cultivator unit volume for domestic use, the aforementioned technical improvements in the cultivators, and the delivery of seed bed preparation combination B620. In order to increase power, the introduction of a 150-PS tractor, as approved at the 13th Farmers Congress of the GDR, must be realized.

The following assessments apply to individual types of crops.

### Grain

Grain was harvested from 2,459,000 hectares. Winter wheat, at 31 percent, accounted for the greatest share of cultivation, followed by winter rye at 25 percent, winter barley at 24 percent, summer barley at 12.5 percent, and oats at nearly 6 percent. The share of winter crops is thus around 80 percent, and the share of rye in total grain production continues to decline slightly. The cultivation of triticale achieved 11,000 hectares. High percentages of winter grains, a reduction in the cultivated area of winter rye, and an expansion of triticale cultivation are in the national economic interest. However, the results of brewing barley production are unsatisfactory. Here, greater reliability must be created in the future, especially in compliance with the TGL [Technical Standards, Quality Provisions, and Delivery Conditions]. Good experience with the cultivation of a winter barley also suitable for brewing was gathered in the GDR for the first time in 1989, and these experiences should be gradually generalized. On the whole, with an average yield of 44.0 decitons per hectare, 10.8 million tons of grain were harvested, although 11.6 million tons were expected. With 59.6 decitons per hectare, the yield from winter barley was the highest. The three-year average for 1986-88 was exceeded by 8.7 decitons per hectare. A mild English winter and a sunny southern European summer were essential prerequisites for this result. In contrast, the winter wheat yield was disappointing. An average yield of only 45.1 decitons per hectare was achieved, 3.8 decitons per hectare less than the average for 1986-88. The reasons for this relatively low yield are a subject of controversy, primarily because there are different opinions on the extent of virus-related

damage. The effect of the drought is especially clear when compared to the winter barley yields.

For winter rye, 33.7 decitons per hectare were 0.4 decitons per hectare more than in the period from 1986 through 1988.

It must be critically assessed that aside from the case of winter barley, the increased application of resources did not result in the expected increase in yield. In terms of cost development and environmental strain, this must lead to thorough analysis in every enterprise in order to draw the necessary conclusions for grain production this year.

### Irrigation

The deficit in precipitation was significant in 1989. As a result, considerable surplus yield was achieved,

according to D. Roth (Table 1). The results confirm the long-term results from large-scale and field tests, as published by Roth et al (1985). However, it must also be noted that especially in Muencheberg with grain and in Straussfurth with potatoes, the volume of additional water clearly exceeded the standard values for average dry years, and thus exceeded the capacity limit of normative-projected overhead irrigation systems. It is regrettable that even the available capacities were not fully utilized. D. Roth says that the main reasons were inadequate preparations for the overhead irrigation season, insufficient labor, in part because of inadequate commitment of seasonal labor, insufficient water availability, but also technical disruptions in the irrigation facilities. He favors a greater exploitation of the existing 1.1 million hectares of irrigation systems, of which 520,000 hectares are overhead irrigation, over expansion of the irrigation area.

**Table 1. Yield and Additional Yield From Overhead Irrigation in Three Experimental Stations in the GDR in 1989**

Type of Crop	Straussfurt/FZB (V 3)			Muencheberg/FZB (D 2/3)			Berge/HUB (D 4)		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Winter wheat	99.0	24.0	150	81.1	37.4	197	97.2	35.4	120
Winter barley	—	—	—	78.9	34.1	60	96.9	12.5	60
Summer barley	80.5	18.9	130	59.4	29.7	177	45.3	8.5	80
Potatoes (Rgr. 3)	528	260	230	381	125	122	502	150	100
Peas	51.5	10.6	80	32.9	17.5	83	—	—	—

### Oil Crops

Yields in oil crops experienced very positive development. With a planned return of 393 kilotons, there was a harvest of 424 kilotons. This corresponds to an average yield of 28.5 decitons per hectare. Rostock bezirk harvested an average of 36.2 decitons per hectare on 30,300 hectares, and LPG Ahrenshagen an average of 43.2 decitons per hectare on 350 hectares.

### Potatoes

According to H. Gall, potato yield, at 210 decitons per hectare, fell short of expectations. The territorial differences are very great. While in Rostock bezirk average yields of 284 decitons per hectare (in LPG Baastorf 406 decitons per hectare on 706 hectares) and in Karl-Marx-Stadt 314 decitons per hectare were achieved, these figures for the central bezirks were only between 156 and 188 decitons per hectare. Thus, larger quantities of potatoes had to be redistributed in order to ensure an uninterrupted supply.

The main reason for the low potato yield in the central bezirks was the length of the dry period in conjunction with high temperatures.

Nevertheless, some enterprises managed to achieve satisfactory results, which can be attributed to the following measures effected in the complex:

- High field cultivation characterized by a lack of couch

grass and good supply of organic substances.

- In the topsoil and topsoil base, no packing to inhibit root growth, and, where necessary, loosening of the humus base before planting and furrowing.
- Avoidance of herbicide damage through exact application of the herbicides at the permissible lower volume.
- Utilization of overhead irrigation and damming possibilities.

In Rostock and Karl-Marx-Stadt bezirks, the highest yields were achieved with late-middle-early and middle-late types such as "Sola," "Lipsi N," "Liu," "Likaria N," "Libana," "Beli," and "Karpina" (often over 450 decitons per hectare) if fungicide treatment to guard against phytophthora took place by mid-September (sometimes against the recommendation of plant-protection agencies). Unfortunately, in many places there was a reduction in both yield and quality as a result of infestations of potato blight as late as September.

What is important now is to winter all potato inventories carefully and with a low level of loss, in order to realize the highest possible yield of seed stock, especially of the seed potato lots that exhibit a small degree of virus activity. Unfortunately, there are a large number of seed lots with a high level of virus activity, caused primarily by the extremely early appearance of virus-transmitting vine lice (vectors) in 1989.

### Sugar Beets

B. Kaestner estimates that despite good preconditions in sugar beet production in the spring of 1989—seeding began in mid-March and was largely finished by early April, and the stands concluded two to three weeks earlier than in normal years—the planned state return of 6,000 kilotons and the additional purchase of 700 kilotons could not be realized due to the further course of the weather.

Besides the extraordinary drought, growth in mass and sucrose in July, August, and September was inhibited especially by virus yellows and vine mildew. Because of this, a number of WTF [expansion unknown] measures could not be as effective as planned.

For 215,000 hectares, which constitute 93 percent of the cultivated area, piled sugar beet seed was available in 1989, and structurally preserving methods for soil cultivation were applied to 130,000 hectares, while extensive experience was gained with the new herbicide strategy, whereby largely weed-free fields were generated until mid-July. These new measures and knowledge should be applied even more deliberately to sugar beet production in 1990, whereby the program for computer-supported soil and stock management in particular must be involved in the decisionmaking process.

To produce the 370-390 decitons per hectare of sugar beets needed for the comprehensive supply, the following must be done in the spring:

- Standard row work must be used thoroughly in seed bed preparation.
- The seeding in late March/early April must be begun rapidly and completed quickly (5 work days/enterprise).
- The grain intervals must be chosen in accordance with the cultivation process, piled seed must be used extensively, and manual standing room adjustments must be carried out as a function of plant development.
- The effective use of soil and leaf herbicides as well as nitrogen fertilizer must be ensured, with a view to ecological aspects as well.

### Fodder

O. Knabe evaluates the results of fodder production as follows. The goal of rough fodder production in 1989 as well was to properly supply the cattle stock in terms of quantity and quality. Because of the long-term drought, poor yields occurred in the central bezirks in particular. The quality of the rough fodder provided as a whole has increased in recent years, due both to structural changes, i.e., higher use of green fodder and more corn—instead of beet tops—and wilt silage, and less fodder straw, and to qualitative improvements in the individual fodder substances.

With wilt silage and hay from the 1989 harvest, greatly improved quality can be expected—favored by the dry

weather—whereby territorial, unfavorable fodder balances can be eliminated and greater possibilities for the increased use of fodder straw are evident without sacrifices in output.

The following focal points and reserves for further intensifying rough fodder production should receive particular emphasis in evaluating developments in recent years. To stabilize yield:

- Creation of further irrigation possibilities (especially dam irrigation, dual water control in depressions) and maintenance of the existing possibilities.
- More complex application of economy measures to increase the output period of grassland stands.
- Further implementation of normative corn cultivation and ensurance of the means of production needed to do so, especially adequate availability of functional corn-laying machines, with auxiliary equipment for fertilization with ammonium phosphate and effective herbicides (e.g., Wonuk).

For quality improvement:

- Improved compliance with optimal cutting time ranges, increase in impact of harvesting technology.
- Further implementation of the wide deposit method and heightened application of ensilage agents, increase in outfitting with dosing equipment and storage containers for ensilage agents.
- Improvement in silo operation, decrease in the percentage of heat-damage silage.

### Summary

This is the first time that an attempt has been made in this form to subject the 1989 harvest results to a critical evaluation by the members of the editorial board.

Attention was given to questions of soil cultivation and irrigation as well as the production of grain, potatoes, sugar beets, and fodder. Special note was made of weak areas that are still present. Critical tasks were elucidated.

### Forest Damage Statistics Reported

90EG0174A Cottbus LAUSITZER RUNDSCHAU  
in German 1 Feb 90 pp 1-2

[Article by ADN/LR: "What Honest Statistics Say About GDR Forests"]

[Text] The Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry, and Foodstuffs on Wednesday gave ADN [German General News Service] the following information on the development of the state of GDR forests in 1989:

On the basis of 2,600 control areas within the framework of the ecological control of forest conditions in late summer and fall of 1989, the actual state of health of forests was ascertained. The most important criteria of this area control by trained specialists are the extent of foliage and needles, and the discoloration of foliage and

needles, respectively. The method of ascertaining corresponds to a recommendation of the specialized UN organization ECE [Economic Commission for Europe] and is applied in most European countries.

Compared to 1988, the evaluation of individual assessments shows a 9.9-percent increase in forest damage, which at present was found in 54.3 percent of the forest area. Lightly damaged is 37.9 percent of the forest area, which means an increase of 7.5 percent.

Medium and severe damage exists in 16.4 percent of our forests; the 1989 increase amounts to 2.8 percent. According to the forest damage report by the FRG Ministry for Food, Agriculture, and Forestry dated 9 November 1989, 52.9 percent of FRG forests are damaged. Light damage (warning stage) exists in 37 percent of the area, and medium and severe damage is present in 15.9 percent [of the area].

Forest damage in the GDR has increased considerably since 1987. Total damage:

1987	31.7 percent
1988	44.4 percent
1989	54.3 percent

Pine trees with a 61.5 percent share of the damaged area are the most severely afflicted tree type and show an increase in damaged area of 9.9 percent.

Damage has also increased noticeably in oak stands, 52.7 percent of which had to be classified as damaged. In 1988/89, 250,000 cubic meters of oak trees died, and more than 500,000 cubic meters had to be assessed as ailing. Fir forests showed damage on 45.4 percent of the area, while the proportion of medium to severe damage for the first time dropped slightly from 13.1 percent to 12.4 percent.

Despite further damage area increases to 39 percent at present, beech trees are the healthiest tree type with only 7.7 percent suffering medium and severe damage. Proportionately, the highest damage areas are in the forests of the Bezirke:

Leipzig	75.4 percent
Magdeburg	62.8 percent
Berlin	62.8 percent
Dresden	62.1 percent
Frankfurt	59 percent

Long-term protection of the forests, and preservation of its many functions for future generations is possible only if one succeeds in noticeably reducing the toxic emissions from industry, energy production, the traffic system, agriculture, and also from individual heating systems.

#### Summary of Damaged Forest Area According to Bezirke, 1988/89 (in Percent)

Bezirke	Light Damage (Warning Phase) Damage Phase 1		Medium and Severe Damage Damage Phases 2-4		Total Damage Damage Phases 1-4	
	1988	1989	1988	1989	1988	1989
Rostock	20.3	30.9	9.0	12.4	29.3	43.3
Schwerin	30.1	32.0	15.3	14.2	45.4	46.2
Neubrandenburg	29.4	34.5	10.3	12.2	39.7	46.7
Potsdam	27.7	36.6	5.3	6.4	33.0	43.0
Frankfurt	26.9	37.9	9.9	21.1	36.8	59.0
Cottbus	38.3	45.1	17.3	16.5	55.6	61.6
Magdeburg	29.8	43.1	13.0	19.7	42.8	62.8
Halle	30.2	30.9	22.6	26.1	52.8	57.0
Erfurt	29.9	37.7	9.4	13.0	39.3	50.7
Gera	34.7	34.5	16.5	18.9	51.2	53.4
Suhl	31.6	41.9	14.4	13.4	46.0	55.3
Dresden	32.2	38.7	18.6	23.4	50.8	62.1
Leipzig	33.0	33.7	39.7	41.7	72.7	75.4
Karl-Marx-Stadt	30.8	36.9	18.0	17.7	48.8	54.6
Berlin	38.1	52.3	32.5	10.5	70.6	62.8
GDR	30.6	37.9	13.8	16.4	44.4	54.3

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